Ceteris Paribus Laws and Argumentation Schemes
Ceteris Paribus Laws and Argumentation Schemes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30854/cnmq5v77Keywords:
Ceteris paribus laws, argumentation schemes, ranking theory, defeasible reasoning, informal logic, epistemic normativity, normality of conditions, (obtained from the UNESCO Thesaurus).Abstract
Objective: The present paper discusses an account on the epistemological foundation of argumentation schemes through the defeasible reasoning theory of ranking beliefs and the ceteris paribus defeasible approach of Wolfgang Spohn (2012). Hence, the purpose is to model a general scheme of reasoning for any argumentation scheme given Spohn’s ceteris paribus conditions model. Methodology: Spohn’s proposal of a general form of normality ceteris paribus laws is capable of being used as an a priori model to every kind of defeasible reasoning normativity, including argumentation schemes in the field of the informal logic. Results: The main result is the structure of a general scheme of reasoning for any argumentation scheme: 1. A is a necessary and sufficient reason to believe in B, iff given that believe in (B/A)>0≥ believe in (B/-A) and believe in (B/A)≥0>believe in (B/-A), that is to say, Ceteris paribus; 2. A is the case; 3. therefore, B must be believed. Conclusions: Normality of conditions is related to a centered epistemic agent in a given background. We believe defeasible a priori the ceteris paribus hypothesis and then we start the use of the mechanism of argumentation scheme. Argumentation schemes are either stereotypical pattern of defeasible reasoning, when the premises only support with likelihood and other things being normal, the acceptance of the conclusion. Practical reasoning is, then, defeasible in essence.
Downloads
References
Aristóteles. (2005). Topics. New Vision Press.
Blair, A. (2009). Informal Logic and Logic. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric,16(29), 47-67. https://yadda.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.b7c07f5a-d2fd-371a-bd96-8a3f07215b80
Blair, A. (2012). A Theory of Normative Reasoning Schemes. In Tindale, C. (Ed.), Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation, (pp. 147-169). Springer.
Cairnes, J. (1888). The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy. Harper & Brothers.
Fodor, J. (1991). You Can Fool Some People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal, Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanations. Mind, 100(397),19-34. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/C.397.19
Fonseca, M. (2023). Belief & Society. UGC.
Govier, T. (2000). A Practical Study of Argument. Wadsworth.
Grice, P. (1975). Meaning. Philosophical Review, 66(3), 377-388. https://semantics.uchicago.edu/kennedy/classes/f07/pragmatics/grice57.pdf
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays. The Free Press.
Kienpointner, M. (1992). Alltagslogik. Struktur & Funktion von Argumentationsmustern. Frommann-Holzboog.
Lumer, Ch. (2011). Arguments Schemes. An Epistemological Approach. Proceedings of the 7th International ISSA Conference on Argumentation.
Mill, J. (1843). A System of Logic. J. W. Parker.
Nagel, T. (1961). The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Explanation. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
Pietroski, P., &. Rey, R. (1995). When Other Things aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46(1), 81-110. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1093/bjps/46.1.81
Pinto, R. (2001). Argument Schemes and the Evaluation of Presumptive Reasoning. In Argument, Inference and Dialectic, (pp. 98-104). Kluwer.
Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of “Meaning.” In Gunderson, K. (Ed.). Language, Mind and Knowledge, (pp. 131-193). University of Minnesota Press.
Reutlinger, A., Schurz, G., Hüttemann, A., & Jaag, S. (2015). Ceteris Paribus Laws. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Spohn, W. (2012). The Laws of Belief. Oxford University Press.
van Eemeren, F. & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge University Press.
van Eemeren, F. (2015). Reasonableness and Effectiveness. In Argumentative Discourse. Fifty Contributions to the Development of Pragma-Dialectics. Springer.
van Eemeren, F. & Kruiger, T. (2015). Identifying Argumentation Schemes. In van Eemeren, F., Reasonableness and Effectiveness. In Argumentative Discourse. Fifty Contributions to the Development of Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 703-712). Springer.
Walton, D. (1996). Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Erlbaum.
Walton, D., Reed, Ch., & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge University Press.
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Miguel Antonio Fonseca Martínez
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Once the manuscript is approved, the authors should file and sign the Right Transfer Format.
