

Where are America, Africa and Asia? A Call to Cross-cultural Philosophizing

(English Version)

¿Y dónde quedan América, África y Asia?: una invitación a filosofar interculturalmente

Onde estão as Américas, a África e a Ásia?: um convite à filosofização intercultural

Received 11 March, 2022. Accepted 9 April, 2022.

Juan Camilo Hernández Rodríguez*

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6675-3636>

Colombia

› To cite this article:

Hernández Rodríguez, J. C.
(2023). Where are America,
Africa and Asia? A call to Cross-
cultural Philosophizing.
Ánfora, 30(54). 58-91.

<https://doi.org/10.30854/anfv30.n54.2023.919>

Universidad Autónoma de
Manizales. L-ISSN 0121-6538.
E-ISSN 2248-6941.
CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

Abstract

In this essay, I hope to formally invite readers to consider becoming interested in the study of other philosophical traditions other than the “Western” (European). For this reason, I conducted a general analysis of a number of the main objections to “non-Western philosophy” (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Russell, and McLuhan). Then I refuted those arguments with other sources and rationales. I will sum up by mentioning a few points worth considering for anyone interested in learning more about any of these traditions. The conclusion is that adopting interculturality as a guiding principle or method could significantly enrich philosophical reflection, or “philosophizing.” However, to do so, acknowledging these cultural traditions as having equal philosophical weight to that of Europeans, and normalizing their research without sacrificing rigor and analysis is necessary.

* Master's student in Science Teaching, Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Manizales. fl_jchernandez540@pedagogica.edu.co

Keywords: intercultural philosophy; Indian philosophy; Chinese philosophy; African philosophy; Amerindian philosophy.

Resumen

En este texto pretendo realizar una invitación al lector a interesarse por el estudio de algunas tradiciones filosóficas distintas a la «occidental» (europea). Para ello, realizo un análisis general de varios de los argumentos de los principales detractores de las «filosofías no occidentales» (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Russell, and McLuhan). Luego, objeto dichos argumentos con diversas fuentes y razonamientos. Finalmente, menciono algunos puntos de reflexión que podrían ser interesantes para aquel que desee investigar a fondo alguna de estas tradiciones. Se concluirá que asumir a la interculturalidad como principio o método podría enriquecer fuertemente la reflexión filosófica o «el filosofar»; sin embargo, para ello es necesario un reconocimiento de estas tradiciones como interlocutores de igual peso filosófico que los europeos y, por lo mismo, se debería normalizar su estudio sin que por ello se pierda el rigor y el análisis.

Palabras clave: filosofía intercultural; filosofía de la India; filosofía china; filosofía africana; filosofía amerindia.

Resumo

Neste texto, pretendo convidar o leitor a interessar-se pelo estudo de algumas tradições filosóficas que não a "ocidental" (européia). Para este fim, faço uma análise geral de vários dos argumentos dos principais detratores das "filosofias não-ocidentais" (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Russell, e McLuhan). Então, me oponho a esses argumentos com várias fontes e raciocínios. Finalmente, menciono alguns pontos para reflexão que podem ser de interesse para qualquer pessoa que deseje investigar qualquer uma dessas tradições em profundidade. Conclui-se que assumir a interculturalidade como princípio ou método poderia enriquecer fortemente a reflexão filosófica ou "filosofante"; no entanto, isso requer o reconhecimento dessas tradições como interlocutores de igual peso filosófico que os europeus e, portanto, seu estudo deve ser padronizado sem perder o rigor e a análise.

Hernández Rodríguez, J. C. (2023). Where are America, Africa and Asia? A call to Cross-cultural Philosophizing. *Ánfora*, 30(54), 58-91.
<https://doi.org/10.30854/anfv30.n54.2023.919>



Palavras chave: filosofia intercultural; filosofia indiana; filosofia chinesa; filosofia africana; filosofia ameríndia.

Introduction

If we open a textbook on the history of philosophy or attend a university lecture on the same subject, it is highly probable that we will read or hear that “Philosophy was born in Greece” or “Philosophy is strictly Western.” It is likely that someone has asked: “What happens to other cultures? Why didn't they have any traditions, authors, treatises, schools, or issues that we could deem philosophical?” However, it is also likely that the teacher or author resorted to arguments that did not fully persuade; or that he or she gave evasive answers or simply replied: “Because that’s the way it is and that’s it.”

This seemingly insignificant change to a philosophical education is more problematic than it first appears since it motivates us to avoid reading philosophers outside of Europe (meaning: Greek, Roman, English, French and German). Furthermore, because we were raised with these kinds of beliefs, we disregarded any chance of opening classrooms, seminars, inaugural conferences, conventions, designing middle and high school curricula, etc. That even included the option of studying philosophy other than those usually read. This is only worse when we consider that these prejudices are perpetuated over generations and in every field where philosophy is studied due to dogmatism.

Well, I make this text available to the reader with the intention of inviting him/her to assume philosophy and the exercise of philosophizing in an intercultural way; that is, not to judge what has already been learned as “official philosophy” or “Western philosophy,” but to open up to discussion with other types of voices *with the same rigor, effort, interest and depth as he/she would with the other texts with which he/she is already in dialogue*. As an invitation, the style of this text departs a little from the typical strictly impersonal argumentative works and, rather, a first-person voice emerges in which, without discarding the references and philosophical analysis, a specific form (of many that exist) is suggested in which one can — and, I consider it desirable to do so — assume the study of philosophy.

In order to accomplish this task, I will carry out this exercise in three stages: first, I will refute arguments that non-European philosophies (Indian, Chinese, Japanese, African, Amerindian) cannot be considered “authentic philosophies.” Second, I will outline generally problems, traditions and authors of these non-Western traditions. And third, I will suggest an introductory bibliography based on primary and secondary sources. The first stage will allow us to put aside prejudices, stereotypes, and other biases that prevent us from opening to dialogue. The second will offer minimal tools so that the reader can, in the future, if desired, study these authors or schools and even introduce them into

their work and classes. In this way, the reader will be able to transition from a position that clearly rejects any possibility of the existence of other types of philosophies different from the European one to a new conception from which the exploration of these other traditions is stimulated.

“Non-European Philosophies? Never!”

I will start by going over the objections that claim there can't be Western philosophical traditions before addressing them in the following section. To this end, I will analyze the positions of five European philosophers who have had an impact on western academics in one way or another. I list them in roman numerals to facilitate the reader's referral of objections to the arguments. It is likely that one of these opponents of non-Western philosophy will be seen as being reflected (or perhaps directly influenced) by Martin Heidegger's words [I]:

The term “European Western Philosophy,” which is used so frequently, is actually a tautology. Why? Because philosophy is fundamentally Greek; Greek means here: philosophy is the source of its essence, and to begin its dissipation, it was necessary to draw on the world of the Greeks and only this world. (Heidegger, 2006 [*WiP*], S. 7)

I have the first argument, then: “The word φιλοσοφία tells us that philosophy is something that for the first time determines the existence of the Greek world” (S. 6); attributing philosophy to other cultures is a loose contextualization. In this order of ideas, it is inappropriate to discuss non-European or “non-Western” philosophy; instead, we should discuss “Western Thought” or “Western Wisdom” (and, who knows, even Indigenous or African Wisdom).

However, this essentialism defended by Heidegger in this article seems to have its roots in Immanuel Kant [II], who

[...] classified humans into whites (Europeans), yellows (Asians), blacks (Africans) and reds (Americans), attributing to them essential characteristics inscribed in human nature: *American Indians lack affection and passion, nothing matters to them, they are lazy; blacks, on the contrary, are full of passion and affection, they are vain and can be educated, but only as servant-slaves; “Hindus” are passive, they can be educated in the arts but not in science because they do not reach the level of abstract*

concepts. [...] “The white race possesses in itself all the motivating forces and talents”¹. (Eze, cited by Garcés, 2005, p. 143)..

In this sense, the other cultures did not develop philosophical systems for random reasons, but because, in fact, *they failed because, quite simply, they could not do it*; “it was not part of their nature.” Because non-Europeans are incapable of developing an abstract thought, it is nonsensical to seek out a philosophical thought, which is by definition abstract. That would be the second argument.

Currently, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (III) has developed this position about non-Europeans’ inability to have an abstract thought in more detail in his *Lessons in the Philosophy of Universal History*. On the one hand, about the “new world” (America), he states:

[...] This culture had a wholly natural character and was destined to vanish as soon as the spirit approached. America has consistently exposed itself as being spiritually and physically flawed. The main character of the Americans of these provinces is a meekness and lack of impetus, as well as humility and creeping submission before a Creole and even more before a European, and it will be a long time yet before the Europeans come to instill in them a little self-respect. It is possible to recognize that those people are inferior in all respects, including with regard to appearance. (Hegel, 2010, p. 396).

On the other hand, about Africa he states:

The African, in his undifferentiated and withdrawn unity, has not yet achieved this distinction between his individuality and his essential universality. Therefore, the knowledge of an absolute being, which would be another being, and superior to the self, is completely absent. As we have already stated, the black person is a representation of the completely barbaric and indolent human being. (p. 408).

And then he says: “[...] [Africa] is not a historic continent. It has offered no movement or evolution” (p. 415). But, even this “pre-history” is applicable to China and India:

China and India continue to exist outside of world history, which is to say that they are a presumption of the historical events whose combination will create historical progress in real time. The unity of substance and subjective freedom

1. Look in particular at Eze’s (2001) miniscule work, where this position of Kant is analyzed *in depth* throughout his complete work, which was studied in German.

is characterized by such opposition from both sides that it is impossible for the substance to reach the level of subjective reflection (p. 434).

For Hegel, the reason China could not realize philosophy was the absolute authority of the emperor (*Huángdì* [皇帝]: wise god king/*Tiānzǐ* [天子]: son of Heaven). This firm state structure would not have allowed China to develop free thought, since, in fact, there was no genuine freedom in the empire. To put it another way, democracy was necessary for China to arrive at a genuine philosophical mindset. On the other hand, in India religion ended up absorbing thought in such a way that, as Hegel points out, attempts at abstract thought led to a reduction of the universal and immaterial to matter and the empirical. There is idealism, but it is an idealism of fantasy and imagination.

In this order of ideas, one can summarize Hegel's objections as follows. First, to the Indians and Africans: their natural state and lack of universality prevents them from thinking abstractly. Second, to the Chinese: the absence of democracy made the development of their spirit impossible and prevented free thought. Third, to the Indians: the subjectivist idealism they hold is not based on the abstract and the empirical; they are unable to reach a conceptual thought, only an imaginary and fanciful one. This would then be the third argument used to refute the existence of non-Western philosophical systems.

Now, this conception of non-European peoples as pre-historical and, therefore, pre-philosophical can also be found in the works on the history of philosophy by Bertrand Russell (1964) [IV]:

Philosophy and science, as we know them now, are Greek inventions. This emergence and development of Greek civilization was one of history's most stunning events. Nothing like it has ever happened before or since. [...] Certain knowledges were passed down from Egypt to Babylonia, which the Greeks afterward used. However, neither science nor philosophy flourished in either of the two. The significance here is that the function of religion did not lead to the pursuit of intellectual adventure. (pp. 10-11).

In this sense, the cause of the delay of which Kant spoke could be explained for Russell — besides a possible lack of genius and the prevailing social conditions — by religion as an obstacle to the development of a secular, independent, purely rational thought, based more on logic than on dogma and faith. So, one has the third argument: in these traditions, thought cannot separate the philosophical from the religious. The non-Western philosophies (Asian, American, and African) are a mystical, esoteric thought; there was no “passage of the μῦθος

(*mythos*) to λόγος (*lógos*) ”. As a result, Russell (1971) expanded his thesis as follows:

Much of what constitutes civilization existed thousands of years ago in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and it had spread to neighboring countries. However, several elements that the Greeks added were missing. What they accomplished in art and literature is well known around the world, but what they accomplished in pure intellectual fields is even more extraordinary. They invented mathematics (in Egypt and Babylon arithmetic and geometry existed but in rudimentary form². The Greeks introduced deductive reasoning (starting from general premises), science and philosophy, they were the first to write history instead of mere annals, they speculated freely about the nature of the world and the purposes of life, without being chained to any inherited orthodoxy. What happened was so incredible that folks are still amazed and speak mystically of Greek genius now. (p. 23).

Precisely because of the mentioned religious restriction, it appears that the Greeks were able to overcome their congeneric religious limitations and, as a result, achieve knowledge. Thus, scientific development seems to be *conditio sine qua non* of the emergence of philosophy. In that at least, there seems to be an agreement between Russell and Heidegger:

The statement “philosophy is Greek in its essence” says nothing more than: The West and Europe, and they alone, are in the depths of their historical course originally “philosophical.” The rise and dominance of the sciences testify to this. Precisely because of the fact of emerging from the deepest layers of the historical course of the European West, that is, of the philosophical course, the sciences are today in a position to print their particular stamp on the history of man throughout the earth. (Heidegger, 2006 [WiP], S. 7).

To this respect, the obstacle of all the other traditions is that their religiosity prevents them from developing scientific advances. This is perfectly articulated with the position of Marshall McLuhan [V], who explains that the cause of this spontaneous Greek intellectual development could only be generated there, due to the invention of abstract alphabetic writing. Overcoming the orality of ancient (“tribal”) traditions and the representation of pictograms or “less abstract” alphabets — such as sinograms (Chinese *hànzì* and *kanji*

2. See the paper by Frankfort et al. (1954). Although it is titled *El pensamiento prefilosófico* (*The Prefilosophic Mind* in its Spanish translation), the original title is *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*, which, when compared to the book's content, appears to be a translation error.

japanese)— *the Greek civilizations could have developed an abstract thought, complex and rich in formal structures that made possible the emergence of philosophy, science and technology.* He says:

In fact, of all the hybrid unions that engender tremendous changes and releases of energy, there is none that surpasses the encounter between an oral and a literate culture. Giving man an eye for an ear with phonetic literacy is, socially and politically, the most radical explosion that can occur in any social structure. This explosion of the eye, often repeated in “backward areas,” is called Westernization. With literacy poised to produce the hybridization of Chinese, Indian, and African culture, we are about to witness a release of human force and aggressive violence that will make history before the phonetic alphabet seem especially calm. This will only happen in the East, since the electrical implosion is bringing to the literate West the oral and tribal culture of hearing. Now the visual, specialized, and fragmented Westerner will not only have to live in close daily relationship with all the ancient oral cultures of the earth, but his own electrical technology is beginning to return visual, or eye, man to tribal patterns and oral with its continuous web of links and interdependencies. (McLuhan, 1994, pp. 70-71).

In this sense, with the “orientalization of the West” developed cultures would obtain a reconnection with their ancient heritages from a rediscovery of the oral and listening. While with “the westernization of the East” these would obtain the Western technological and social development, thanks to the fact that these, unlike the Eastern ones, did manage to develop a visual expression — and, therefore, abstract — that was consolidated in the construction of a literate writing free of any representation or orality. The letters do not represent symbols or things in the world, but from the construction of complex structures from these the creation of complex concepts and meanings is possible. For this very reason, “[...] the inability of oriental culture, oral and intuitive, to coincide with European patterns of experience, rational and visual” (p. 36) would explain why in those cultures a philosophy could not develop in the authentic sense of the word (although with the subsequent Westernization of the East it probably has [as is the Kyoto school]). The East has religion, myth, intuition (auditory, symbolic); the West, science, theories, reason (the visual, alphabetical). Although with Modernity there has been a mutual influence, it is undeniable that as a starting point, the East could not have had philosophical thought; they lacked the alphabet, the visual, the abstract.

There are five arguments by which *it seems* that it is imprecise to speak of “non-Western philosophies.” First: that the term ‘φιλοσοφία’ comes from the

Greek. This reflects that the Greeks, and only they, managed to have such a level of reflection that they discovered, systematized and named their work explicitly. Second: essentially, no one other than the white race (the European) has in the essence of their human nature the fundamental conditions to develop a genuinely philosophical thought. Third: Precisely, these peoples did not meet those conditions because: a) they did not overcome the state of nature (America and Africa); b) its political organization did not know freedom and democracy (China); and c) the metaphysics failed to reach the abstraction of the concept, but lagged behind in imagination and fantasy. Fourth: religion was an obstacle to scientific development, and this was reflected in philosophy. And fifth: by not reaching the development of an alphabet and abilities mainly linked to vision, the Eastern man (and, perhaps, also the African and the Amerindian) could not develop an abstract thought, but an intuitive one, symbolic and mostly linked to listening.

Now, once the main objections have been collected through which it seems that it is impossible to speak of “non-Western philosophies,” it is time to see the objections that can be made to them and, with this, open the possibility of studying other philosophical traditions, different from the European.

But Why Not...?

Once the objections have been exposed, I will analyze them one by one in order to evaluate whether or not it is pertinent to sustain the thesis that the study of “non-Western philosophies” is possible and desirable:

In the first argument (I) it is argued that the term “philosophy” is Greek and that only the Greeks were self-aware of their philosophical work. The problem with this premise is that it seems to assume from the outset a certain linguistic solipsism according to which it is not possible to translate terms from one language to another. For example, the term “four” to indicate the fourth natural number comes from the Latin “*quattor*,” but it does not follow that before the Romans people did not know the number as such. Moreover, if what one talks about in philosophy is about concepts — as in fact one does — since these are universal, the particular names or languages one uses as long as the meaning is the same. As Frege (2016) indicated, the concept of “green” or the proposition “x is green” mean the same thing regardless of the language or grammar we use (p. 279). The same happens with the term “philosophy”; the fact that it was historically nominated like this for the first time in Greece does not mean that

before Pythagoras there was no philosophy or that in other parts of the world it had not arisen but with another name.

On the other hand, in China the term 哲學 (*zhéxué*) (“doctrine of wisdom”) (Bauer, 2009, p. 20) was already used to refer to one who he has a fondness for learning or, in the words of Confucius (or his students): 「可謂好學也已」 (“you can say he is eager to learn”) (Confucius, 1861, I, 14).³ Likewise, although it was not until the 19th century that the term 哲学 (*tetsugaku*), was coined in Japan, as Bouso shows in the “Introductory framework” of *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, “[...] long before Japan already had a solid philosophical tradition” (Bouso, 2016, p. 40). In that order of ideas, it does not seem to be something exclusive to the Greeks to name philosophy with the traditional — and, therefore, ambiguous — characterization of “love [φιλία] of wisdom”.

Now, it is not so clear either that for the Greeks the concept of *philosophy* was clearly defined and delimited. For example, the terms “sage” and “philosopher” were not differentiated until Plato and, above all, Aristotle. Hence, as narrated by Aristides, various poets, pre-Socratics, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were called σοφιστής (“he who knows”) (Aristides, quoted in: Melero, 1999, DK 79 A 1). “The problem is complicated by the fact that, together with the term ‘philosopher’, they used other words: ‘sage,’ ‘sophist,’ ‘historian,’ ‘physicist,’ ‘physiologist’” (Ferrater, 1975, t. 2, p. 661, voice “philosophy”). Although the Platonic effort to differentiate itself from sophistry is understood, the definition of “philosophy” as if it were already something closed and absolute is not entirely clear (and still is not). Precisely this problem constitutes the object of reflection of “metaphilosophy” or “periphilosophy” (the branch that deals with what philosophy itself is) (pp. 397 et seq., voice “periphilosophy”). For example, philosophy could be understood as science (Husserl, 2009), as a way of life (Hadot, 2006), as desire (Lyotard, 1994), creation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991), etc. In this sense, if there is no clear criterion or definition of what philosophy is, demanding that other traditions have done so, is simply incoherent.

On the other hand, it is evident that the arguments II and III of Kant and Hegel, respectively, are based on racial prejudices in which non-biological characteristics are attributed (social, for example), to a simple adaptation effect of the human body and skin when exposed to UV rays. Without going into details, it does not seem evident that from the skin color of a person or society it can be deduced that they are “lazy, meek, courageous, less intelligent, etc.” (Wade, 2011, p. 210-12). Furthermore, this racial essentialism is dangerous,

3. On the other hand, Oriol Fina Sanglás translates directly: “This man can be called a philosopher, that is, a lover or student of wisdom” (Confucius, 1975 [LY], p.116).

since, based on it, slavery (as seen in the authors' quote) or racial supremacy have been justified.

Now, for the sake of the discussion, I will not focus too much on the immense problem that this type of racial prejudice has of its own; although, without a doubt, it is a problem that deserves several in-depth studies, such as the one carried out by Appiah (2019). However, it would be expected that with the current scientific and social advances, fewer people would defend this type of position. It is probable that most of the readers reject the theses from those authors; however, it seems that there are categories created from those colonial theories that continue to operate in our imaginations and that would be worth questioning: "West," "East" and "New World."

Leaving aside the aforementioned ethnic prejudices, it seems that Hegel's position adds a greater problem: he attributes essential qualities to each culture by attributing categories —according to him, "universal" — to encompass the world from two differentiating categories: for on the one hand, the concept of "New World," referring to the American continent as something without development, as raw material, as the habitat of savages. On the other hand, the concept of "Orient" is associated with magical, irrational, "mystical" thinking.

Regarding the first aspect, it is worth making an exception to the norm to this modern colonial thought: Michel de Montaigne (1984),⁴ who in his essay "Of the Cannibales" states:

To be honest, we have no other measure of truth and reason than the opinions and customs of the country in which we live and where we always believe that there is the perfect religion, the perfect politics and the perfect and fulfilled management of all things. Those people are wild in the sense that we call wild the fruits that nature has spontaneously produced, while in truth the really wild are those that we have diverted, with artifice, from the common ones. (t. 1, p. 153).

Actually, the fact that the criterion about what is considered correct, valid or true is stipulated from one's own belief system, can be considered perhaps the greatest epistemological obstacle to recognizing the philosophical theories of other cultures for what they are: *philosophical theories*. To judge the others as wild is, after all, to completely reject their thought for who they are and not for what they think. This is the danger of the aforementioned racial essentialism. Paradoxically, that prejudice derived from that feeling of European superiority

4. It is also worth mentioning the opinion of Voltaire in his *Philosophy of History* (2001), Leibniz in his *Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese* (2000) or the *Notes on the East* by Schopenhauer (2011).

(or “Eurocentrism”) is, as Dussel (1999) explains, *effect — and not cause — of the processes of conquest and colonization*:

[...] the centrality of Europe in the world-system is not the result of an internal superiority accumulated during medieval Europe over and against other cultures. Instead, it is a fundamental effect of the simple fact of the discovery, conquest, colonization, and integration (subsumption) of Amerindia. This simple fact will give Europe the determining comparative advantage over the Ottoman-Islamic world, India and China. Modernity is the result of these events, not their cause. Consequently, it is the administration of the centrality of the world-system that will allow Europe to transform itself into something like the “reflexive consciousness” (modern philosophy) of world history [...]. Even capitalism is the result and not the cause of this conjunction between European planetarization and the centralization of the world system. (pp. 148-149).

One could reply to both Hegel and Kant — and their followers — that even that moral and intellectual superiority to which they appeal so much to reaffirm Europe’s hegemony over the world is the result of the plundering and appropriation of those other colonized cultures. As Castro Gómez (2005) explained in the work Said:

The great merit of Said is to have seen that the discourses of the human sciences are sustained by a geopolitical machinery of knowledge/power that has subalternized the other voices of humanity from a cognitive point of view, it means, that it has declared as “illegitimate” the simultaneous existence of different ways of knowing and producing knowledge. Said shows that the birth of the human sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries meant the invisibilization of the historical multivocality of humanity. Europe’s territorial and economic expropriation of the colonies was matched by an epistemic expropriation that condemned the knowledge in them to be only the “past” of modern science (p. 47).

In this sense, Eugenio Nkogo Ondó (2006), James (2001) —and, especially, Martin Bernal’s extensive three-volume work (1987; 1991; 2006), as well as the response to detractors (2001)— have shown how Western thought has not only been based on Afro-Asian cultures, but even it has appropriated them to present them as autochthonous creations.

Regarding the supposed “mystical” spirit attributed to the philosophical systems of Asia, the extensive and profound work that Tola and Dragonetti (2008) carried out in their work *Filosofía de la India (Philosophy of India)*, in

addition to responding to Hegel's criticisms, analyzes common aspects between different Indian and European philosophical schools. The same can be said of *La filosofía nahuatl estudiada en sus fuentes (The Nahuatl Philosophy Studied at its Source)* by Miguel León-Portilla (2017). In both cases, as in previous works (Hernández, 2019; 2020a; 2020b; 2020c) it is possible to see how in Indian and indigenous philosophical traditions there is a high level of abstraction, rationality and formal logical thinking; but naturally, with peculiarities that differentiate them from Europeans.

This very point refers us to the fourth objection (IV), that of Russell, which appeals to the religiosity of these cultures to affirm that this prevented their development of a rational philosophy. In addition to the aforementioned sources that show extensive examples of rationality in these traditions, it would be worth asking why the European religiosity of the ancient and medieval world was not an obstacle, but a catalyst for philosophical thought. Even if one were to appeal to the obsolete account of Zeller's (1968) "passage from mythos to logos," it has already been refuted by Jaeger (2001, p. 151; 2003) or Kathryn Morgan (2004) who names numerous examples of how religious and mythical thought influenced Greek thought, so that, rather than speaking of "a passage from myth to logos" it is more appropriate to speak of a "logicization" of myth.

However, the distinction in Indian literature between the श्रुति (*śruti*) or religious texts (such as the Vedas, the *Upaniṣad*, etc.) and philosophical treatises is also mentioned (Tola and Dragonetti, 2008). The same could be said of the five Chinese classics with respect to the *Analects* of Confucius or the Daoists (Bauer, 2009); as well as the myths of the Mexican gods with respect to the philosophical poems of the *Tlamatinime* (wise Nahua ["Aztec"] philosophers) (León-Portilla, 2017); or, even, between religious texts of Kemetic (Egyptian) philosophy such as the *Egyptian Book of Dead* with respect to the *Sebayt* (philosophical texts of ethics, mainly) (Tamosauskas, 2020).

Now, moving on to McLuhan's argument (V), there does not seem to be a clear relationship between writing systems and cognitive development *as the author wants to show*. It has been clear that writing contributed to the development and evolution of human thought (Watson, 2005, pp. 63-85), but it is not entirely clear why symbolic thought could be less rational than the conceptual or formal thought. There are several reasons for this:

Firstly, that other thoughts, such as that of India, were structured in alphabets that fulfill the conditions McLuhan says; even Mayan or hieroglyphics are a mixture between ideograms and phonograms... Secondly, because it is well known that writing was initially developed for non-academic purposes — curiously, in India it was the opposite (Sanskrit was a cultured language) and its theories are not usually recognized as philosophical. This is explained

by Dupont (1994), who points out that, even if there was an abstract alphabet among the Greeks, it was used for technical purposes (accounting, etc.), while orality and memory were only for poetry and philosophy. Plato himself states this in *Phaedrus* by appealing to a supposed Egyptian myth in which Theuth (Thoth) (God of wisdom, writing, science, magic, etc.) puts writing before Thamus (Amon) (superior god, later identified with Ra) to consider whether or not it is a good gift for humans. After exposing such a gift, Thamus replies:

For it is forgetfulness that they will produce in the souls of those who learn them, not caring about memory, since trusting what is written, they will arrive at the memory from outside, through foreign characters, not from inside but from themselves and by themselves. It is not, therefore, a memory drug that you have found, but a simple reminder. Appearance of wisdom is what you provide to your students, not truth. (Platón, 2010 [*Phaedr.*], 275a).

And, thirdly, it has not been demonstrated why the symbol could not cover up a complex abstract idea. It means, it has not been said that a symbol — graphic or narrative (as it has been the Greek golden number [Φ], the Cartesian evil genius, the Platonic demiurge, etc.) — a set of highly complex reflections with a high philosophical content could not be found; for example, the *om* indian (Om), the *tajítú* ("yin-yang") Chinese (☯) or the Abyayalense origen law⁵ (☉☉). As Urbina (2004) states:

He [an indigenous grandfather] was able to dismantle the partial story, to see its structures and to see that those stories were basically telling the same thing. This is going strictly in the direction of philosophy. [...] There is a strict code, an internal logic that underlies the appearances that show diversities and even contradictions. These mythical meta-codes are those perceived and managed by some indigenous scholars, very few, as are the few true philosophers of the West. (p. 144).

Without wishing to be redundant, numerous counterexamples and questions emerge to refute each of the initial arguments. After all, it seems that it is not so rational to think that in Europe, and only Europe, is and has been possible to develop a philosophical thought. After all, let us reason: what is more absurd — or, in their terms, "mythical" — to believe that in the face of conditions and

5. "In Tule, Kuna language Abya-Yala means 'land-in-full-maturity,' a formula totally contrary to the New World, it is imposed by those who were interested in forging it to their ambitious liking" (Urbina and Peña, 2016, pp. 8-9). In this sense, it is an indigenous native name that could be given to this continent as opposed to the mentioned European category.

needs of human existence the human being from different cultures has questioned and speculated on philosophical problems; or, to believe that a culture (not as old as others) has awakened from the dogmatic dream of myth and, almost as a miracle, it discovered the use of reason without the help of anything but themselves?

“But and Where to Start?”

So far two stages have been reviewed for those who approach non-European philosophies: first, to categorically deny any possibility of a philosophy other than the European one; and second, to open a small door by critically evaluating those beliefs or prejudices that prevent us from recognizing them. It is necessary to overcome the third epistemological obstacle: to know where to start the research.

Increasingly more institutes and curricula are beginning to recognize the importance of studies of the philosophies of Asia, America and Africa, as they have not been properly articulated to official curricula, there is still a lack of information about which authors, problems and critical studies can be studied. With a propaedeutic spirit in mind — and recognizing the sacrifice in detail and precision of the terms — I will offer a general explanation and recommend a bibliography⁶:

About America

It is possible to differentiate at least four general lines — although, as so *broad* the Amerindian thought, even to speak of these four aspects would be “daring”: the Nahuatl philosophy (misnamed “Aztec”), the Mayan and Tojolabal, the Inca (also called “Andean” or “Quechua”) and the Colombian Abyayalense.

With respect to the first, the most notable and valuable study is that of Miguel León-Portilla, in the doctoral thesis *The Nahuatl philosophy studied in its sources* (2017) which showed how the *Tlamatinime* (Nahua philosophers) achieved great philosophical ideas about the dual Absolute (*Ometeotl*), the human being, education, etc. In this research, several fragments are collected in their original language (Nahuatl) and their corresponding translation. Also, in *Fifteen*

6. It is remarked that this suggestion is made from the gathered documentation so far. Lots of critical studies —even the primary sources— are difficult to access, either by translations or even to access to material itself.

Poets of the Nahuatl World (1994) full bilingual poems can be found so that the reader can refer to the primary sources. As current researches the studies of Maffie (2000; 2002; 2005; 2014) and Hernández (2019) can be referred to on how to interpret such thinking.

And regarding Mayan philosophy, the valuable work of José Mata Gavidia (1950) must be recognized. His doctoral thesis *Existence and Perdurance in the Popol-Vuh* has shown how concepts such as existence, persistence, the God-cosmos relationship and coexistence (or “community existence”) are fundamental to Mayan philosophical thought. This topic has also been extensively studied by Carlos Lenkersdorf (2003; 2005), who shows how the idea of “we” is key in Tojolabal Mayan thought. Likewise, León-Portilla (1994) on the time-reality relationship or the work of Mercedes de la Garza (1987) on the shamanic vision in Mayans are of great relevance. As is that of Alexis McLeod (2018) regarding their metaphysical thought.

With respect to philosophy in the Tahuantinsuyo (the Inca or “Andean”), ideas such as the relationships between space-time (*pacha*) or matter (*cay*) and idea (*camac*) are addressed. (Bouysse-Cassagne *et al.*, 1987). As a rigorous, extensive, detailed and comprehensive analysis, the book *Andean Philosophy* by Josef Estermann (2009) is worth reviewing. Similarly, worth highlighting on the same subject are Mario Mejía Huamán (2005), Yáñez del Pozo (2002) or Rojas (2019) on the Huarochirí manuscript and, mainly, Víctor Mazzi *Inkas and Philosophers: Postures, Theories, Source Studies, and Reinterpretation* (2016) and *Presentation of Juan Yunpa: An Inka Philosopher in the 17th Century* (2015).

Finally, from an “Amazonian” perspective, but that *it is not reducible to it*. In reserach it has been called “Abyayalense,” although it seems to be just as generic as “Amerindian.” In the Colombian case, Urbina (2004; 2010, ed.), Torres (2004a; 2004b) and Reichel-Dolmatoff (1997; 2005) are remarkable for introducing themselves to this type of thought in a general way; mainly, to refer to shamanism. Páramo (2004) on the logic of myths; Pabón (2002), on the aesthetic and cosmological conception of cruelty; or Hernández (2020c), on metaphysics, offer a documented introduction. The valuable work Castaño Uribe (2020) has performed in making the thinking behind Chiribiquete mountain range visible, just as Urbina has done in Lindosa (Urbina and Peña, 2016). The interviews conducted by James and Jiménez with specialists on the subject (2004) or Ortiz (2005) with the mamos (“elders”) of Sierra Nevada also provide valuable information. Finally, it is important to mention Chindoy (2020) regarding the Kamëntšá community’s philosophy on the concepts of time, beauty, and spirit.

About Asia

If Korea, Tibet, the Middle East, etc. have a wide culture, and probably, philosophical tradition, it is enough here to name authors regarding their three greatest philosophical cultures: India, China, and Japan, as well as Babylonian philosophy in Asia Minor.

Regarding India, many texts have been published. Its classification into more than 12 schools (each with sub-schools; and these, into doctrines) throughout more than 23 centuries turns into something extremely demanding. Different topics as the logic and the nature of knowledge, the matter and spirit relationship, atoms, a happy life, the I-Absolute relationship, destiny, and emptiness etc. are addressed. However, as introductory materials, the work of Mahadevan (1991) as well as that of Tola and Dragonetti (1999; 2010), and Williams et al. (2013) and de Arnau (2005; 2008; 2012) are noteworthy. As primary sources, the translations of the different *Upaniṣad* (1998; 2002; 2009a; 2009b) or the *vedānta* (2000), a study of the *Brahma sūtras*, by Consuelo Martín Díaz (ed.), or the translations of Nāgārjuna (2006; 2011) or Vasubandhu by Juan Arnau (Arnau, 2011), or the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by Laia Villegas (Īśvarakṛṣṇa, 2016), or the critical study of the *Yoga sūtras* of Patañjali by the B. K. S. S. Iyengar (2003) are also remarkable. The critical selection of the *Prajñāpāramitā* of Costero (ed., 2006), and Hurie et al. (1993) and Tola & Dragonetti (1999) are also important; as well as the selection of the Buddha *sūtras* by Tola & Dragonetti (1999; 2012), Dragonetti (2006) and the Bhikkhu Bodhi (2019).

With respect to China, although many issues are also discussed, there is a marked interest for associating them with politics, righteous governance and a virtuous ethical life, over a short or long term period. For example, in Indian theories called for liberation from suffering. In general, six major schools of thought are recognized: Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Legalism, Mohism and the School of Names; although, the *Sourcebook* of Wing-Tsit Chan (1963) has at least 44 schools. In addition to this work — paramount and remarkable as a primary source and as a critical study — the valuable study of Anne Cheng (2002) as well as the studies of Bauer (2009), Berger (2019), and Feng Youlan (1989) should be highlighted, and in particular, the study of Chinese metaphysics by Li and Perkins (2015). As primary sources, one can find the *Analects* of Confucius (1997), and the *Four Classic Books of Confucianism* by Perez (2002) and Fina Sanglas (1998). The classics of Daoism are also fundamental: Laozi or the *Daò Dé Jīng* (2015), the *Zhuangzì* (1996) and the *Liezì* (2006), as well as *The Four Canons of the Yellow Emperor* (2010). Cleary's anthology (1983) on *Huayan* Buddhism, and Han Fei Zi's *Art of Rulership* (2010) or Mo Ti's *Mozi* (1987) are also considered.

Since Japanese philosophy is also quite broad, the recommendation is to consult the *Sourcebook* by Heisig, Kasulis and Maraldo (2011), edited into Spanish by Bouso (2016). Both as a critical study and as a compendium of fragments of primary sources. Also worth mentioning is the work of Buddhist philosopher Ehei Dōgen, the *Shobogenzo* (2015), as well as the works of some philosophers of the Kyoto school: Kitarō Nishida (1985; 2006), Hajime Tanabe (2014) and Keiji Nishitani (1999), as well as the anthology by Agustín Zavala (1995; 1997). This school is characterized by establishing bridges between elements of Buddhist and Western philosophical thought (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Husserl, Hegel, existentialism, etc.) with respect to broad topics as nihilism, freedom, and unity.

Little is known about Babylonian philosophy. Besides the study of Frankfort *et al.* (1954), and the translation of a philosophical dialogue on divine justice by Silva (1972), a very recent in-depth and detailed study by Marc Van de Mieroop (2015; 2018) on this tradition is available.

About Africa

Regarding Africa, the least studied traditions in Spanish-speaking countries compared to those from Asia and America, one may recommend a bibliography on three groups: Kemetic (Egyptian) philosophy, Babylonian philosophy and African philosophies. As expected, these traditions cover varied topics. In Egypt it covers the hexapartition of the soul, transcendence, and ethics. In other traditions, the bibliography deals with destiny in the *Ifá* divination system of the Yoruba, the soul-body relationship or the concept of “truth” of the Akan, and *chi* in Igbo cosmology.

On Kemetic philosophy, the work of Frankfort *et al.* is worth considering (1954), as well as the works of Wallis Budge (2006), Proto (2012), James (2001), Kete Asante (2000), and Bolanno (2017). Regarding primary sources, although access to papyri, and their analysis is difficult, as an introduction, the *Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts* (Allen, 2005), the different translations and analysis of the *Egyptian Book of the Dead* (Anonymous, 1898; 1981; 2003; 2017) — although it is not by nature a philosophical text, some concepts may be applicable — can be considered as well as the most valuable anthology in Spanish regarding Egyptian texts: *Literature on Ancient Egypt: A Brief Anthology* by Sánchez Rodríguez (2003).

In addition to the previously mentioned authors, Eugenio Nkogo Ondó (2006; 2017), Fernando Susaeta (2010), Brown (2004) and the compilation book of critical studies edited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed., 2002) are worth reviewing. As specialized critical studies, the works of Gordon (2008),

Hamminga (2005), Tamosauskas (2020), Ukpokolo (2017), Wiredu (2004), and Afolayan and Falola (eds., 2017) are remarkable. In particular, Tempels' (1959) study of Bantu philosophy deserves special mention, because, despite its antiquity, it reveals important information of his thought such as his ontology, his concept of *muntu* or "person," and his ideas regarding ethics and morality.

Conclusions

So far, I have covered the stages of those who approach non-European philosophies: firstly, to reject them undoubtedly; then, to critically evaluate the arguments that are usually put forward regarding the impossibility of their existence, subsequently, to overcome them; and, finally, to superficially identify what materials and problems can be found to start studying and researching them.

To conclude and remain consistent with this invitation, the author proposes this reflection: if philosophers critically search for truth, think reflectively about the ideas and theories themselves, fairly, objectively, and impartially problematize concepts, then the most consistent thing is that, before saying "[whatever it is] is not philosophy" the most appropriate response should be a first approach to that kind of thinking, its works, postulates, etc. and then evaluate, with *well-founded criteria*, whether this or that thesis is really worthy of being considered valid, solid, or even genuinely philosophical.

The glorification here presented does not intend to validate every non-European theory because of their differences or novelties. Instead, as previously mentioned, it is an invitation for readers to open themselves to the vast world and to continue addressing the same problems that are still of concern and, that have probably been investigated (justice, truth, existence, beauty, etc.), only diversifying the perspectives, voices and positions; but, of course, without forgetting the rigor or academic demands when studying these postulates. This may not solve most of the philosophical problems people already are aware of, but to refine a little better the attempted answers they already have or, better, raise new questions to problems they had not previously considered.

References

- Appiah, K. A. (2019). *Las mentiras que nos unen: replanteando la identidad*. Taurus.
- Bauer, W. (2009). *Historia de la filosofía china*. Trad. Daniel Romero. Barcelona: Herder.
- Bernal, M. (1987). *Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*. Vol. 1. Rutgers University Press.
- Bernal, M. (1991). *Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*. Vol. 2. Rutgers University Press.
- Bernal, M. (2001). *Black Athena Writes Back: Martin Bernal Responds to his Critics*. Duke University Press.
- Bernal, M. (2006). *Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*. Vol. 3. Rutgers University Press.
- Bouso García, R. (2016). "Marco introductorio." In: Heisig, J. W., Kasulis, T. P., Maraldo, J. C., Bouso, R. (Eds.). *La filosofía japonesa en sus textos*. Herder.
- Castro Gómez, S. (2005). *La hybris del punto cero: ciencia, raza e ilustración en la Nueva Granada (1750-1816)*. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Confucio. (1975). *Lun Yu o Comentarios filosóficos*. In: *Los cuatro libros clásicos*. Trad. Oriol Fina Sanglas. Bruguera.
- Confucius. (1861). *The Analects*. Trans. James Legge. In: *Chinese Text Project [CTP]*. <https://ctext.org/analects>.
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1991). *¿Qué es la filosofía?* (trad. Thomas Kauf). Anagrama.
- Dupont, F. (1994). *L'invention de la littérature. De l'ivresse grecque au livre latin*. La Découverte.
- Dussel, E. (1999). Más allá del eurocentrismo: El sistema-mundo y los límites de la modernidad. In: S. Castro-Gómez, Ó. Guardiola-Rivera y C. Millán

de Benavides. (Eds.). *Pensar (en) los intersticios. Teoría y práctica de la crítica poscolonial*. CEJA.

Eze, E. C. (2001). "El color de la razón." In: Mignolo, W. (Ed.). *Capitalismo y geopolítica del conocimiento. El eurocentrismo y la filosofía de la liberación en el debate intelectual contemporáneo* (pp. 201-521). Ediciones del Signo.

Ferrater Mora, J. (1975). *Diccionario de filosofía*. Sudamericana.

Frankfort, H. A., Wilson, J. A. & T. Jacobsen. (1954). *El pensamiento prefilosófico I: Egipto y Mesopotamia*. Trad. Eli de Gortari. Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Frege, G. (2016). "Concepto y objeto." In: *Escritos sobre lógica, semántica y filosofía de las matemáticas*. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM.

Garcés, F. (2005). "Las políticas del conocimiento y la colonialidad lingüística y epistémica." In: Walsh, C. (Ed.). *Pensamiento crítico y matriz de(colonial): reflexiones latinoamericanas*. Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar.

Hadot, P. (2006). *Ejercicios espirituales y filosofía antigua*. Trad. Javier Palacio. Siruela.

Hegel, G. W. F. (2010). *Lecciones de la filosofía de la historia*. Trad. Josep María Quintana. In: Rühle, V. (Ed.). *Obras completas 2: Líneas fundamentales de la filosofía del derecho. Lecciones de la filosofía de la historia*. Biblioteca de Grandes Pensadores. Gredos.

Hernández Rodríguez, J. C. (2019). El Omoteotl: la dualidad como fundamento metafísico trascendental. *Perseitas*, 7(2), 248–273. <https://doi.org/10.21501/23461780.3290>

Hernández Rodríguez, J. C. (2020a). Advaita vedānta: la no-dualidad como fundamento de la realidad. *Aporía Revista Internacional de Investigaciones Filosóficas*, 18, 73–91. <https://doi.org/10.7764/aporia.18.1129>

Hernández Rodríguez, J. C. (2020b). La función de la palabra: el lenguaje en la relación pensamiento-realidad de algunas escuelas filosóficas indias. *Polisemia*, 16(30), 24–40. <https://doi.org/10.26620/uniminuto.polisemia.16.30.2020.24-40>

- Hernández Rodríguez, J. C. (2020c). Principios metafísicos fundamentales de la cosmología chamánica abyayalense. *Principios: Revista de Filosofía (UFRN)*, 27(53), 63–89. <https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2020v27n53ID20151>
- Heidegger, M. (2006). *¿Qué es la filosofía?* Trad. Jesús Adrián Escudero. Herder.
- Husserl, E. (2009). *La filosofía, ciencia rigurosa*. Trad. M. García Baró. Encuentro.
- Jaeger, W. (2001). *Paideia: los ideales de la cultura griega*. Trad. Joaquín Xirau y Wenceslao Roces. Fondo de la Cultura Económica.
- Jaeger, W. (2003). *La teología de los primeros filósofos griegos*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- James, G. G. (2001). *Legado robado: la filosofía griega es filosofía egipcia robada*. Trad. Georgina Falú. Falú Foundation Edition.
- Leibniz, G. W. (2000). *Discurso sobre la teología natural de los chinos*. Trad. Lourdes Rensoli. Biblioteca Internacional Martin Heidegger.
- León-Portilla, M. (2017). *La filosofía náhuatl estudiada en sus fuentes* (11th ed.). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Liotard, J. F. (1994). *¿Por qué filosofar?* Trad. Godofredo González. Altaya.
- McLuhan, M. (1994). *Comprender los medios de comunicación: las extensiones del ser humano*. Trad. Patrick Ducher. Paidós.
- Melero Ballido, A. (Ed. y trad.) (1999). *Sofistas. Testimonios y fragmentos*. Planeta-DeAgostini.
- Montaigne, M. de. (1984). *Ensayos completos*. Trad. J. de Luaces. Tomo 1. Orbis.
- Morgan, K. (2004). *Myth and Philosophy from de Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nkogo Ondó, E. (2006). *Síntesis sistemática de la filosofía africana*. Ediciones Carena.

- Russell, B. (1964). *La sabiduría de Occidente*. Trad. Juan García Puente. Aguilar.
- Russell, B. (1971). *Historia de la filosofía occidental*. Tomo 1. Trad. Julio Gómez de La Serna y Antonio Dorta. Espasa.
- Schopenhauer, A. (2011). *Notas sobre Oriente*. Trad. Adela Muñoz. Alianza.
- Tamosauskas, T. (2020). *Filosofía africana: pensadores africanos de todos os tempos* [e-book]. Amazon Kindle.
- Tempels, Placide. 1995. "Bantu Philosophy." In: Mosley, A. (Ed.). *African Philosophy: Selected Readings*. Edited by Albert Mosely. Prentice Hall.
- Tola, F. y Dragonetti, C. (2008). *Filosofía de la India: del veda al vedānta, el sistema sāmkhya. El mito entre la oposición entre el "pensamiento" indio y la "filosofía" occidental*. Kairós.
- Urbina, F. (2004). "Chamanismo y pensamiento abyayalense." In: James, A. J. y Jiménez, D. A. (Eds.). *Chamanismo: el otro hombre, la otra selva, el otro mundo* (pp. 83-124). Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia.
- Urbina, F. y Peña, J. E. (2016). Perros de guerra, caballos, vacunos y otros temas en el arte rupestre de la Serranía de La Lindosa (Río Guayabero, Guaviare, Colombia): Una conversación. *Ensayos. Historia y teoría del arte*, 20 (31). 7-37. <https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ensayo/article/view/62026>.
- Voltaire. (2001). *Filosofía de la historia*. Trad. Martín Caparrós. Tecnos.
- Wade, P. (2011). Raza y naturaleza humana. *Tabula Rasa*, 14(1), 205-56. <http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/tara/n14/n14a09.pdf>.
- Watson, P. (2005). *Ideas: historia intelectual de la humanidad*. Crítica.
- Zeller, E. (1968). *Fundamentos de la filosofía griega*. Trad. Alfredo Llanos. Ediciones Siglo XX.

Recommended Bibliography

About América

Primary Sources (critical studies).

- Castaño Uribe, C. (2020). *Chiribiquete: la maloka cósmica de los hombres jaguar*. Sura.
- Chindoy, A. (2020). *A Decolonial Philosophy of Indigenous Colombia: Time, Beauty, and Spirit in Kamëntšá Culture (Global Critical Caribbean Thought)*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- León-Portilla, M. (1994). *Quince poetas del mundo náhuatl*. Booket.
- León-Portilla, M. (2017). *La filosofía náhuatl estudiada en sus fuentes* (11th ed.). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Mazzi Huaycucho, V. (2016). *Inkas y filósofos: posturas, teorías, estudios de fuentes y reinterpretación*. (Edición del autor).
- Ortiz, J. (Comp.). (2005). *Tratados e historias primitivas. Universo Arhuaco*. Ediciones Mestizas.
- Urbina, F. (Ed.). (2010). *Palabras del origen: breve compendio de la mitología de los uitotos*. Ministerio de Cultura.

Secondary Sources

- Bouysse-Cassagne, T. Harris, O., Platt, T. y Cereceda, V. (1987). *Tres reflexiones sobre el pensamiento andino*. Hisbol.
- De la Garza, M. (1987). «Los mayas. Antiguas y nuevas palabras sobre el origen». In: Monjarás-Ruiz, J. (Ed.). *Mitos cosmogónicos del México indígena* (pp. 15-86). Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia.
- Estermann, J. (2009). *Filosofía andina: sabiduría indígena para un nuevo mundo*. Instituto Superior Ecueménico Andino de Teología.

- Hernández Rodríguez, J. C. (2019). El *Ometeotl*: la dualidad como fundamento metafísico trascendental. *Perseitas*, 7(2), 248–273. <https://doi.org/10.21501/23461780.3290>
- Hernández Rodríguez, J. C. (2020c). Principios metafísicos fundamentales de la cosmología chamánica abyayalense. *Principios: Revista de Filosofía (UFRN)*, 27(53), 63–89. <https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2020v27n53ID20151>
- James, A. J. y Jiménez, D. A. (Eds.). (2004). *Chamanismo: el otro hombre, la otra selva, el otro mundo*. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia.
- Lenkersdorf, C. (2003). *Cosmovisión maya*. Centro de Estudios Antropológicos, Científicos, Artísticos, Tradicionales y Lingüísticos “CeAcatl”.
- Lenkersdorf, C. (2005). *Filosofar en clave tojolabal*. Centro de Estudios Antropológicos, Científicos, Artísticos, Tradicionales y Lingüísticos “CeAcatl”.
- León-Portilla, M. (1994). *Tiempo y realidad en el pensamiento maya: ensayo de acercamiento*. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Maffie, J. (2000). ‘Like a Painting, We Will Be Erased; Like a Flower, We Will Dry Up Here on Earth’: Ultimate Reality and Meaning According to Nahua Philosophy in the Age of Conquest. *Ultimate Reality and Meaning* 23(4), 205–318. <https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.23.4.295>.
- Maffie, J. (2002). Why Care about Nezahualcoyotl?: Veritism and Nahua Philosophy. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 32, 73–93. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/004839310203200104>.
- Maffie, J. (2005). “Aztec Philosophy”. In: *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://www.iep.utm.edu/aztec/#H9>.
- Maffie, J. (2014). *Aztec Philosophy: Understanding a World in Motion*. University of Colorado Press.
- Mata Gavidia, J. (1950). *Existencia y perduración en el Popol-Vuh*. Guatemala, C. A.

- Mazzi Huaycucho, V. (2015). *Presentación de Juan Yunpa. Un filósofo inka en el siglo XVII* [e-book]. Librosperuanos.com.
- McLeod, A. (2018). *Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time*. Lexington Books.
- Mejía Huamán, M. (2005). *Hacia una filosofía andina: doce ensayos sobre el componente andino de nuestro pensamiento*. (Edición del autor).
- Pabón, M. C. (2002). América cruel: una aproximación al doble. *Nova et Vetera*, 46(1), 6-17.
- Páramo, G. (2004). «Lógica paraconsistente y el mito chamánico». In: James, A. J. y Jiménez, D. A. (Eds.). *Chamanismo: el otro hombre, la otra selva, el otro mundo* (pp. 39-68). Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia.
- Reichel-Dolmatoff, G. (1997). «Cristales de roca de los chamanes Desana y el universo hexagonal». En: *Chamanes de la selva pluvial* (pp. 149-162). Trad. E. Sánchez. Guildford. Themis Books.
- Reichel-Dolmatoff, G. (2005). «La cosmovisión chamánica». In: *Orfebrería y chamanismo* (pp. 23-31). Banco de la República-Villegas Editores.
- Rojas, C. (2019). *Ontología andina desde el manuscrito del Huarochiri* [texto inédito]. https://www.academia.edu/40033709/ONTOLOGÍA_ANDINA_DESDE_EL_MANUSCRITO_DE_HUAROCHIRI.
- Torres, W. (2004a). «El chamán, el tigre y el cuerpo sin órganos». In: James, A. J. y Jiménez, D. A. (Eds.). *Chamanismo: el otro hombre, la otra selva, el otro mundo* (pp. 125-149). Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia.
- Torres, W. (2004b). *Uturunco Runa: historias de la gente jaguar*. Ediciones Zahir.
- Urbina, F. (2004). «Chamanismo y pensamiento abyayalense». In: James, A. J. y Jiménez, D. A. (Eds.). *Chamanismo: el otro hombre, la otra selva, el otro mundo* (pp. 83-124). Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia.
- Urbina, F. y Peña, J. E. (2016). Perros de guerra, caballos, vacunos y otros temas en el arte rupestre de la Serranía de La Lindosa (Río Guayabero, Guaviare, Colombia): Una conversación. *Ensayos. Historia y teoría del arte*,

20 (31). 7-37. <https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ensayo/article/view/62026>.

Yáñez del Pozo, J. (2002). *Yanantin: La filosofía dialógica intercultural del Manuscrito del Huarochiri*. Abya-Yala.

About Asia

Primary Sources (Critical studies).

Arnau, J. (2011). La Vimśatikākārikā de Vasubandhu. *Estudios de Asia y África*, 46(2), 287-302.

Bhikkhu Bodhi. (2019). *En palabras del Buddha: una antología de Discursos del canon pali*. Trads. Abraham Vélez, Aleix Ruiz y Ricardo Guerrero. Kairós.

Chan, W.-T. (Ed.). (1963). *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton University Press.

Cleary, T. (1983). *Entry Into the Inconceivable: An Introduction to Hua-yen Buddhism*. University of Hawaii Press.

Confucio. (1975). *Los cuatro libros clásicos*. Trad. Oriol Fina Sanglás. Bruguera.

Confucio. (1997). *Lun Yu: reflexiones y enseñanzas*. Trad. Anne-Hélène Suárez. Kairós.

Confucio. (2009). *Los cuatro libros*. Trad. Joaquín Pérez Arroyo. Paidós.

Costero, J. I. (Ed.). *La perfección de la sabiduría. Textos breves Prajñāparamita*. Biblioteca Nueva.

Dōgen, E. (2015). *Shōbōgenzō. La preciosa visión del Dharma verdadero*. Trad. D. Villalba. Kairós.

Dragonetti, C. (Ed.). (2006). *Udāna: la palabra de Buda*. Trotta.

- Han Fei Zi. (1998). [HF] *El arte de la política (los hombres y la ley)*. Trad. Y. Ning & G. García Noblejas. Tecnos.
- Heisig, J. W., Kasulis, T. P., Maraldo, J. C. y Bouso, R. (Eds.). *La filosofía japonesa en sus textos*. Herder.
- Heisig, J. W., Kasulis, T. P., y Maraldo, J. C. (Eds.). *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook*. University of Hawai'i Press.
- Hurie, A., Mundy, S. y Calle, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Sutra de la atención. Sutra del diamante*. EDAF.
- Īśvarakṛṣṇa. (2016). [SK] *Sāṃkhyakārikā: las estrofas del Sāṃkhya* (L. Villegas, Trad.). Kairós.
- Iyengar, B. K. S. (2003). *Luz sobre los Yoga Sūtras de Patañjali*. Kairós, edición crítica bilingüe.
- Lao Tsé. (2015). *Tao Te Ching. Los libros del Tao*. Trad. I. Preciado Idoeta. Trotta.
- Lie Zi. (2006). [Liezi] *Lie Zi: El libro sobre la perfecta vacuidad*. Trad. I. Preciado Idoeta. RBA.
- Martín Díaz, C. (Ed.). (1998). [Māñ. Up.] *Conciencia y Realidad. Estudio sobre la metafísica advaita con la Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, las kārikā de Gauḍapāda y comentarios de Śaṅkara*. Trotta.
- Martín Díaz, C. (Ed.). (2000). [Ved. S.] *Brahma-Sūtras Upaniṣad con los comentarios advaita de Śaṅkara*. Trotta.
- Martín Díaz, C. (Ed.). (2002). [Brh. Up.] *Gran Upaniṣad del Bosque Upaniṣad con los comentarios advaita de Śaṅkara*. Trotta.
- Martín Díaz, C. (Ed.). (2009a). [BG] *Bhagavad Gītā Upaniṣad con los comentarios advaita de Śaṅkara*. Trotta.
- Martín Díaz, C. (Ed.). (2009b). *Upaniṣad con los comentarios advaita de Śaṅkara*. Trotta.

- Mo Ti. (2002). [Mozi] *Mo Ti. Política del amor universal*. Trad. C. Elorduy. Tecnos.
- Nāgārjuna. (2006). [VV] *Abandono de la discusión* (J. Arnau, Trad.). Siruela.
- Nāgārjuna. (2011). [MK] *Fundamentos de la vía media* (J. Arnau, Trad.). Siruela.
- Nishida, K. (1985). *Indagación del bien*. Trad. A. L. Bixio. Gedisa.
- Nishida, K. (2006). *Pensar desde la nada*. Trad. J. Masiá y J. Haidar. Sígueme.
- Nishitani, K. (1999). *La religión y la nada*. Trad. R. Bouso. Siruela.
- Preciado Idoeta, I. (Ed.). (2012). *Los cuatro libros del emperador amarillo*. Trotta.
- Silva, J. (1972). Diálogo sobre la justicia divina. La teodicea babilonia. *Estudios orientales*, 7(2), 211-225.
- Tanabe, H. (2014). *La filosofía como metanoética*. Trad. R. Maldonado. Herder.
- Tola, F. y Dragonetti, C. (Eds.). (1999). *El sūtra del loto de la verdadera doctrina: Saddharmapundarikasūtra*. México: El Colegio de México, Asociación Latinoamericana de Estudios Budistas.
- Tola, F. y Dragonetti, C. (Eds.). (1999). *Majjhima Nikāya: Los sermones medios del Buddha*. Kairós.
- Tola, F. y Dragonetti, C. (Eds.). (2012). *Diálogos mayores de Buda [Digha Nikāya]*. Trotta.
- Zavala, A. J. (Ed.). (1995). *Textos de la filosofía japonesa moderna. Antología*. El Colegio de Michoacán.
- Zavala, A. J. (Ed.). (1997). *Ensayos filosóficos japoneses*. Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes.
- Zhuang Zi. (1996). [Zhuangzi] *Zhuang Zi «Maestro Zhuang»*. Trad. I. Preciado Idoeta. Kairós.

Secondary Sources.

- Arnau, J. (2005). *La palabra frente al vacío: la filosofía de Nāgārjuna*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Arnau, J. (2008). *El arte de probar: ironía y lógica en la India antigua*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Arnau, J. (2012). *Cosmologías de la India*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Bauer, W. (2009). *Historia de la filosofía china*. Trad. Daniel Romero. Trotta.
- Berger, D. (2019). *Introducción a la filosofía asiática*. Trad. Alejandro Flórez y Juliana Acosta. Universidad de Caldas.
- Cheng, A. (2002). *Historia del pensamiento chino*. Edicions Bellaterra.
- Li, C. y Perkins, F. (2015). *Chinese Metaphysics and its Problems*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mahadevan, T. M. P. (1991). *Invitación a la filosofía de la India* (L. García Urriza, Trad.). Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Tola, F. (1999). Filosofía de la India I. Vedismo, brahmanismo, hinduismo. En M. Cruz Hernández (Ed.), *Filosofías no occidentales* (pp. 97-136). Trotta.
- Tola, F., y Dragonetti, C. (2010). *La filosofía de la India. Del veda al vedānta. El sistema sāmkhya. El mito de la oposición entre el «pensamiento» indio y «filosofía» occidental*. Kairós.
- Van de Mieroop, M. (2015). *Philosophy before the Greeks: The Pursuit of Truth in Ancient Babylonia*. Princeton University Press.
- Van de Mieroop, M. (2018). Theses on Babylonian Philosophy, *Journal of Ancient Near Eastern History*, 5(1-2), 15-39. <https://doi.org/10.1515/janeh-2018-0004>.
- Williams, P., Tribe, A. y Wynne, A. (2013). *Pensamiento budista: una introducción completa a la tradición india*. Trad. Agustina Luengo. Herder.

Youlan, F. (1989). *Breve historia de la filosofía china*. Ediciones en Lenguas Extranjeras.

About África

Primary Sources (Critical studies).

Allen, J. P. (2005). *The Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts*. Society of Biblical Literature.

Anónimo. (1898). *The Egyptian Book of The Dead. The Chapters of Coming Forth by Day*. Ed. Ernest A. Wallis Budge. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner y Co., Ltd.

Anónimo. (1981). *Libro egipcio de los muertos*. Trad. Albert Chapmdor. EDAF.

Anónimo. (2003). *Libro egipcio de los muertos: primera versión poética según el texto jeroglífico, publicado por Wallis Budge*. Trad. A. Laurent. Editorial Astri S. A.

Anónimo. (2017). *Libro de los muertos*. Trad. Federico Lara Peinado. Tecnos.

Sánchez Rodríguez, Á. (Ed.). (2003). *La literatura en el Antiguo Egipto (breve antología)*. Egiptomanía S. L.

Secondary Sources.

Afolayan, A. y Falola, T. (2017). *The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bolanno, M. (2017). Tiempo y espacio en la Duat: observaciones respecto de los *Libros del más allá del Reino Nuevo*. *Estudios de Asia y África*, 52(1), 119-140.

Brown, L. (2004). *African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives*. Oxford University Press.

- Eze, E. C. (Ed.). (2002). *Pensamiento africano: cultura y sociedad*. Ediciones Bellaterra.
- Frankfort, H. A., Wilson, J. A. Y T. Jacobsen. (1954). *El pensamiento prefilosófico I: Egipto y Mesopotamia*. Trad. Eli de Gortari. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Gordon, L. (2008). *An Introduction to Africana Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hamminga, B. (Ed.). (2005). *Knowledge Cultures: Comparative Western and African Epistemology*. Rodopi.
- James, G. G. (2001). *Legado robado: la filosofía griega es filosofía egipcia robada*. Trad. Georgina Falú. Falú Foundation Edition.
- Kete Asante, M. (2000). *The Egyptian Philosophers: Ancient African Voices from Imhotep to Akhenaten*. Sussex Academic Press.
- Nkogo Ondó, E. (2006). *Síntesis sistemática de la filosofía africana*. Ediciones Carena.
- Nkogo Ondó, E. (2017). Introducción a la filosofía africana. *Faia*, 7(28-29), 1-15.
- Proto, F. (2012). La teología kemética (La esencial del pensamiento kemético. A Eugenio Nkogo Ondó 2/6). *Faia*, 1(2), 1-13.
- Susaeta Montoya, F. (2010). *Introducción a la filosofía africana: un pensamiento desde el cogito de la supervivencia*. Ediciones IDEA.
- Tamosauskas, T. (2020). *Filosofía africana: pensadores africanos de todos os tempos [e-book]*. Amazon Kindle.
- Tempels, P. (1959). *Bantu Philosophy*.
- Ukpololo, I. (Ed.) (2017). *Themes, Issues and Problems in African Philosophy*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Wallis Budge, E. A. (2006). *Ideas de los egipcios sobre el más allá*. Trad. Esteve Serra. El Barquero.

Wiredu, K. (Ed.). (2004). *A Companion to African Philosophy*. Blackwell Publishing.