

Education, Philosophy and Human Freedom. Pedagogical Strokes from Nietzsche, Freire and Zuleta

[*English Version*]

Educación, filosofía y libertad humana. Trazos pedagógicos
a partir de Nietzsche, Freire y Zuleta

Educação, filosofia e liberdade humana. Traços pedagógicos
de Nietzsche, Freire e Zuleta

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Yesid Niño-Arteaga*

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5628-8854>

Colombia

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Abstract

Objective: this Reflection article examines the relationship of philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche, Paulo Freire and Estanislao Zuleta regarding their positions on the interaction among education, philosophy and human freedom. **Methodology:** a critical-philosophical approach was applied, which allowed for an interpretative and critical reflection on the object of study. For this, part of the literature, ideas and approaches of these three thinkers were examined, who all agree on the possibility of expressing the problem of education as liberation. Based on the theoretical arguments and positions clearly identified in these thinkers, the valuations and interpretations of the present work emerged; that is, a critical interpretation pertaining to what is stated in this theoretical triad. **Results:** for the three authors, education and its relation to human freedom implies

* Master in Etnoliterature. Graduate of arts. Doctoral student in Education Sciences, Red de Universidades Estatales de Colombia. Professor at Universidad de Nariño, Colombia. Member of the HISED research group. Email: yesidnio@hotmail.com

the permanent openness towards the critical attitude, the construction-transformation and the ethical-political start towards other human relations with knowledge and values. According to (Nietzsche) education persists in the fight against all kinds of oppression and the invisibility of alternativeness (Freire). We find in philosophical education, the recognition of the Other and the development of critical thinking, a possible source of life affirmation (Zuleta). **Conclusions:** freedom in education is knowing in order to be able to dissent, choose, co-create with the Other, to achieve a way of being and cause more disturbance; having an attitude that allows us to feel or voice our opinions about society, to understand which information, methods, stories are consumed, accepted and transgressed and learn to criticize and criticize them, perhaps pointing to other ethical frameworks and other ways of thinking.

Keywords: Philosophy of education; Cultural criticism; Latin American pedagogy.

Resumen

Objetivo: este artículo de Reflexión examina la relación de los filósofos Friedrich Nietzsche, Paulo Freire y Estanislao Zuleta en cuanto a sus posturas sobre la interacción entre educación, filosofía y libertad humana. **Metodología:** se aplicó un enfoque crítico-filosófico, que permitió elaborar una reflexión interpretativa y crítica sobre el objeto de estudio. Para ello, se examinó parte de la literatura, ideas y planteamientos de estos tres pensadores que coinciden en la posibilidad de expresar el problema de la educación como liberación. Con base en los argumentos y posturas teóricas claramente identificadas en estos pensadores, emergieron las valoraciones e interpretaciones del presente trabajo; es decir, una interpretación crítica que se sustenta en lo planteado en esta tríada teórica. **Resultados:** para los tres autores la educación y su relación con la libertad humana implica la permanente apertura hacia la actitud crítica, la construcción-transformación y el arranque ético-político hacia otras relaciones humanas con los saberes y los valores (Nietzsche); persistir en la lucha contra todo tipo de opresión y la invisibilización de la alternatividad (Freire); encontrar en la educación filosófica, desde el reconocimiento del Otro y el desarrollo de pensamiento crítico, una posible fuente para lograr la afirmación de la vida (Zuleta). **Conclusiones:** la libertad en educación es saber con el fin de disentir, elegir, co-crear junto al Otro, para lograr un modo de ser y estar más inquietante; una actitud que permita sentir o desprender pensamiento sobre la sociedad, para comprender qué información, métodos, relatos se consumen, aceptan y transgreden y aprender a criticarlos y a criticarse, quizás apuntando hacia otra ética y hacia otras formas de pensar.

Palabras-clave: Filosofía de la educación; Crítica cultural; Pedagogía latinoamericana.

Resumo

Objetivo: este artigo de Reflexão examina a relação dos filósofos Friedrich Nietzsche, Paulo Freire e Estanislao Zuleta sobre suas posições sobre a interação entre educação, filosofia e liberdade humana. **Metodologia:** foi aplicada uma abordagem crítico-filosófica, que permitiu uma reflexão interpretativa e crítica sobre o objeto de estudo. Para isso, parte da literatura, ideias e abordagens desses três pensadores foram examinadas as quais coincidem na possibilidade de expressar o problema da educação como libertação. Com base nos argumentos e posições teóricas claramente identificadas nesses pensadores, emergiram as avaliações e interpretações do presente trabalho; isto é, uma interpretação crítica baseada no que é afirmado nesta tríade teórica. **Resultados:** para os três autores, a educação e sua relação com a liberdade humana implicam a abertura permanente à atitude crítica, a construção-transformação e o começo ético-político em relação a outras relações humanas com conhecimentos e valores (Nietzsche); persistir na luta contra todos os tipos de opressão e a invisibilidade da alternatividade (Freire); encontrar na educação filosófica, a partir do reconhecimento do Outro e do desenvolvimento do pensamento crítico, uma possível fonte para alcançar a afirmação da vida (Zuleta). **Conclusões:** a liberdade na educação é saber para discordar, escolher, co-criar com o Outro, alcançar um modo de ser e ser mais perturbador; uma atitude que nos permite sentir ou deixar de pensar na sociedade, para entender quais informações, métodos, histórias são consumidas, aceitas e transgredidas e aprender a criticá-las e criticá-se, talvez apontando para outra ética e outras formas de pensar.

Palavras-chave: Filosofia da educação; Crítica cultural; Pedagogia latino-americana.

Introduction

It is still valid to highlight the correspondence that the philosophy and education of the human being has had throughout its history. From Thales of Miletus, described by Aristotle as the first philosopher, the importance of relating to reality was already raised, not only through questions but also through attitudes that managed to display research, critical capacity and development of thought.

In the Sixth century B. C., with the commonly called pre-Socratic thinkers, an appreciable conception of what can now be termed as part of a natural philosophy has been disseminated (Feyerabend, 2015); These thinkers gave way to a study of being from a philosophical perspective that implied both an empirical and rational perspective, in which a space directly linked to teaching will be established. Subsequently, the history of the West will speak of "schools" such as the Pythagorean, the Platonic Academy, the Aristotelian Lyceum, the Garden of Epicurus or the Cinosargo of the Cynics, where arithmetic, musical, political and philosophical activity were the fundamental part in the construction of knowledge.

Antisthenes, for example, taught his lessons on the outskirts of the polis, in the middle of a raised, secluded and dusty road, whose simplicity also symbolized freedom and autonomy. On this periphery was located the Cinosargo or the particular site associated with the possible teaching of Cynical philosophy. The Cinosargo was built in honor of the dog that stole the meat that was intended as an offering in the temple of the mighty Heracles (Onfray, 2002). In this teaching and learning space "there were those excluded from citizenship, those to whom the chance of birth had not made them worthy of access to civic positions" (Onfray, 2002, p.37). In this way, the context of ancient philosophy proposes a set of "spiritual exercises" that are intended to "produce transformations in the nature of the subject" seeking improvement, improvement and self-realization as part of an authentic life (Onfray, 2002, p.15).

Faced with the above, it is worth asking whether within the purposes of that ancient philosophy there is no urgency to develop both the part of logos and mythos that occurs in the human (Gadamer, 1997) and, in this sense, does this form of education not tend for the mental and spiritual transformation that gives the human being a better way of living? Freeing oneself from the state of misery and unbearable restlessness, is it not how we understand the flashes of wisdom and disturbing freedom?

With these questions the article will present a reasonable version, from a critical-philosophical approach, about part of the literature, ideas and approaches of three thinkers that theoretically interrelate in the possibility of expressing diverse conceptions about the problem of education as liberation. Friedrich

Nietzsche investigates the failure of the educational project proposed by the philosophy of the Enlightenment that was assumed by European society from a theological background, whose effect was the extension of nihilism and hegemonic morality. Paulo Freire, who displays a relevant criticism regarding the idea of freedom proposed by the Capitalist system, which instead of liberating intends to strengthen the discourse of colonization and commodification that results in the great antagonism of Freirean pedagogy and, perhaps, of all pedagogy. And Estanislao Zuleta, who reaffirms the confidence in a philosophical education as a manifesto of the relations present in the possibility of living-thinking-liberating-loving that concern the idea of an integral education of the human being.

Philosophy and Education: Rapport in History

However, during the Middle Ages a Western philosophical thought and proto-models of a possible universalization of human education began to be consolidated. In this epoch, the first universities are created and, in the same way, monasteries and abbeys are strengthened. It is in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, with the advances of modern physics and the philosophy of the Enlightenment, that the question of the universal character of education as a public right at the service of society under the direction of the State is raised. This was postulated as a public service at the same time as its mandatory, free and secular nature was promoted, while at the same time claiming the logic of science and the ideological and moral discourse protected in an ideal democracy as part of its formative process.

For thinkers like Rousseau (1999), Condorcet (1993) and Kant (2015), for example, education was the clear and elementary way of seeking and acquiring freedom. Rationality would be understood as a characteristic of human nature that aspires to freedom, since through the formation of the rational being is how humanity can develop in history through a critical attitude and the achievement of its own autonomy (Kant, 2015). Although this educational project, which is founded on a freedom, learned from the rational, ironically relied on the political conceptions of the time that sought the strengthening of the State, at the same time that the awareness of an enlightened universal culture was spreading.

Some political events of the nineteenth century were ambivalent in regards to the education of the human being, rather than afflictive. If we recognize the signs of the impulse towards the war that entered into the majority of social projects and which, in turn, gave rise to the market turmoil (first industrial, then banking) and the horrific mistake of civil and world wars, as elements of pos-

sible progress that are worth calling into question. This disturbing social order was accepted by a large part of the governments throughout the world. The theoretical apparatus of the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the medieval religious creed was adopted but from a socio-cultural context it was almost entirely dogmatic and reactionary (Santos, 2014). Moreover, if in the Nineteenth Century, human education was sustained towards an apparent progress in relation to the world and the other; does it seem unfortunate to aspire to the search for freedom by identifying the human only from a scientific-mathematical level that seeks adaptation but no transformation?

Therefore, what idea of freedom is spoken in the educational project of the Enlightenment and how was it adopted by European society? What objectives were proposed by the educational projects in Latin America against the contents and values they were attending? What can philosophy say about human freedom and its relation to education? Political freedom, freedom of thought, civil liberty, freedom of worship, freedom of expression, sexual freedom? From where can a critique of the discourse of freedom in education be established? Is it possible to critically address that the educational design that infers freedom based solely on increasing knowledge? In addition, why nowadays this idea of freedom is obsolete, despite the fact that it is the basis of much of the purposes of school education?

These questions guide the analysis and criticism against the discursive practices that reinforce hegemonic morals to the ways of thinking and acting of human beings in order to extend control and coercion as forms of support for the idea of normality required by power structures (Chomsky, 2001). Given this, it should be noted that philosophical activity conceives education as a key or essential element in the relationship with the search for freedom that permeates the future of human beings. Critically understanding the time of education and pedagogy in relation to the philosophical opportunity can allow the continuous development of critical, liberating and transformative thinking.

Methodology

This study follows a method based on a critical-philosophical approach, which allowed us to elaborate an interpretative and critical reflection on the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche, Paulo Freire and Estanislao Zuleta regarding the interaction between philosophy, education and freedom. For this, part of the literature, ideas and approaches of these three thinkers that theoretic-

cally interrelate in the possibility of expressing different conceptions about the problem of education as liberation were examined.

Based on the theoretical arguments and positions clearly identified in the material under study, the valuations and interpretations of the present work emerged; that is, a critical interpretation that is based on what is stated in this theoretical triad.

Results

Nietzsche: *Aurora* and the Critique of the Enlightened Education Project

Both Nietzsche and Kant share the idea that education has to be the seed of human development, of the construction and transmission of culture. However, as for its development, Nietzsche departs from the Kantian luminosity, *Aufklärung*, as the introduction of the human being only in the field of scientific knowledge. In disagreement with the search for a possible moral order formulated by the Kantian categorical imperative and its aspiration to universality, the idea of education in Nietzsche seeks to destabilize the cultural order through another conception of the practices of freedom and relations with knowledge.

Therefore, in *Morgenröthe*, Nietzsche symbolizes a possibility of concrete transformation, dawn or a new dawn in terms of the constant inquiry of moral values that, in turn, imply a critique of the pedagogical and philosophical fabric of the Enlightenment, whose preeminence grounded in criteria of utility, obedience and scientificity, conceived by Nietzsche (2000). This idea draws on the decline of the relationship of the human with nature, since the tendency is to favor the assimilation of certain relations of force that are convenient to the cultural fabric, an idea that is deeply criticized by the German philosopher.

Aurora. Reflections on moral prejudices, can be seen as a proposal for the affirmation of plurality and for the incessant transvaluation (Nietzsche, 2003), which Nietzsche presents as the possibility of "men of conscience" (Nietzsche, 2009), and not only as a vehement controversy to the moral values of the time. There the possible project of transformation and criticism towards the present that Nietzsche constructed around education is strengthened.

Thus, Nietzsche observes European Nihilism and its decadent morals as a result of the Enlightenment project assumed from a generalized way of thinking in which it is noticed that the human is still immersed in the tapestry of an ideology and a theology that also seems to agree with scientific knowledge

(Nietzsche, 2009). Rationality is now rationalization, that is, "the methodical organization of life and the submission of human behavior to a specific set of rules in order to obtain expected results" (Castro-Gómez, 2016, p.53).

According to Foucault (2008), education - and not only enlightened education, of which perhaps Kant is the most representative figure in terms of its philosophical aspect - can be defined as a project of transformation and criticism of the present, where it pertains to granting skills and knowledge on the subjects through the transmission of knowledge. At the same time, it is about modifying the ways of being of the subjects (Foucault, 2008).

In this regard, Gadamer (1997) spoke of a first Enlightenment that ironically had its peak with the extension of Christianity and its reduction of Pagan myths and then a second Enlightenment that emerged principally during the Eighteenth century. In both eventualities the countenance and the exercise of that theological ideology (a form of knowledge that is stamped on the platform of social relations where the human is suspended in the case of a supreme purpose that is provided by the religious stadium). Nietzsche identifies it directly with the education of his time, mentally nourished by the Enlightened philosophy, but dosed in the body by Judeo-Christian remorse and the feeling of greed and its weak superstition of a beyond without humanity, that is, without life (Nietzsche, 2009).

Thus, in *Aurora's* thirteenth aphorism, "For the new education of the human race", a possible pedagogical realization is contemplated: the terrible consequence in the human that implies the practices of punishment. In addition, Nietzsche warns the perverse formula with which this concept is used, since cause and effect has become "cause and punishment" (Nietzsche, 2009, p. 26). This means the invasion of elements of punishment, not only in the field of education, but in all areas of life, which have stripped the possible events of its innocence, forcing the human being to feel his own existence as a punishment. : "It is as if the delusions of jailers and executioners have so far directed the education of the human race!" (Nietzsche, 2009, p. 27). In the Enlightenment period, human education based on the transmission of scientific knowledge and the adoption of the technique is positioned as something universal that can perpetuate the order or balance of the social system. This means Eurocentric knowledge was assumed to be the essence that determines the relationship with knowledge and in this line of ideas are precisely teachers, students and other actors within the educational process (Santos, 2014; Kincheloe, 2001).

The human, for Nietzsche, does not separate itself from reason, but the reason is for Nietzsche symbolization and experience of difference. "Man " means "thinker": there the madness is hidden "(Colli and Montinari , 2004, p.32). Nietzsche distrusts the supposed "great clarity" of scientific knowledge. In his phi-

osophy, logical compromise is governed by the principle of contradiction as a surface of difference (Colli and Montinari, 2004) and he acknowledges that intellect is held in fixed forms because these are inevitable within life, but that does not mean that they are considered as true simply because they are reached through a logical effort. Nietzsche understands that the person is truly free when he develops actively and intimately in the present of his story.

We have surpassed the Greeks in the elucidation of the world, through natural history and human history, and our knowledge is much broader, our judgments more correct and moderate. A sweetened sense of "humanity" [*Menschlichkeit*] has also been spread, encouraged by the Enlightenment, which has weakened men - but that weakness, metamorphosed into morality, presents an excellent aspect and honors us. Man now has much greater freedom, his problem is that he uses it so little; the fanaticism of the opinion is greatly diminished. That ultimately we want to live in this age before any other, is essentially the merit of science. There is no doubt that for no generation there has been such a sum of noble joys as much as for ours - even if it has no stomach or palate to be able to experience many of those joys - but with all that freedom, today one lives well only when one is limited to understanding, without wanting to take an active part - this is the modern inconvenience. Those who take an active part are less attractive than ever. What fools they must be! Thus the danger arises that knowledge takes revenge on us, just as ignorance took revenge on us during the Middle Ages (Colli and Montinari, 2008, pp.61-62).

For this reason, the German philosopher contradicts the critical and ethical dimension of the projection of subject and humanity that would increase the inventiveness of a hegemonic culture. In this sense, they are not the warlike policies, the fanaticism for the Judeo-Christian dogma or the pious acceptance of the bad conscience, simple metaphors of a previous cultural criticism, but they are linked to the educational reality of the present, which identifies as coming from the Enlightenment philosophy developed in an entirely dogmatic context. The mistake, Nietzsche emphasizes throughout *Aurora*, was to propose human education as a whole as a simple device for the configuration of docile subjects for mercantilist and utilitarian purposes.

However, as in many cases, in some aspects his proposal is somewhat elitist. Let's remember for example, like Plato, Nietzsche also defended a pyramidal social system and the need for labor servant-slave in order to have a minority that could devote to the creation, leisure, culture and in the same way as Schopenhauer (2002) he completely distrusts democracy and ideologies, however, he considers

sickly and decadent the way in which the culture of his time appropriates the educational project proposed by the enlightened philosophy.

Now, the metaphor of "jailers and executioners" results in a subversion not only of the educational system but also of the comfort of the teacher's thinking, who for Nietzsche are also "priests" of bad conscience. They do this by not critically examining their own thinking since they prefer to become designers, transmitters and executors of the theories and practices of the domestication of the human.

What is the domesticated subject? Well, the person who is gratified by obeying faithfully before thinking creatively. On the contrary, Nietzsche's pedagogical criticism is a commitment to the poor subjective, affective and creative reality that the philosopher observes in human beings and in the sense of humanity, freedom, values that are supplied by the resplendent and seemingly vigorous educational course.

Liberation? The German philosopher manages to warn of the subjective and spiritual oppression implied by this type of enlightenment applied and distributed from authoritarian and indifferentiable institutions and subjects. "Thoughts are signs of a game and a struggle of affections: they are always in connection with their hidden roots" (Colli and Montinari, 2004, p.148). It is not only a critique of the way of thinking that manages to be imposed from the formation of the subject, it is also an attempt to make a reassessment of the supposedly exclusive or immovable aspects of the relations of knowledge and power that are immersed in the apparatus of the education. There it can be distinguished the meaning of that Nietzschean liberation.

It turns out, then, to be rather easy to support the insistent thesis that conceives Nietzschean philosophy as a promise aimed at devastation or domination, which is based on "the inerradicability of hatred, cruelty, tyrannical impulses, in the logic of subjection, subordination, etc." (Siemens, 2014). However, from another understanding of his philosophy, starting with his reinterpretation from his posthumous work that was critically collected by Colli and Montinari (2004, 2008) through the studies conducted by Heidegger (2013), Deleuze (2013), Jaspers (2003), for example, it can be argued that his philosophy "culminates in affirmative ideals that exclude domination and devastation" (Siemens, 2014, p. 101), which can provide foundations for alternative and new elements for the constant critical openness of human and social sciences (Deleuze, 2013).

Under this other interpretation, it can be said that Nietzschean philosophy does not deny Kantian *Sapere Aude* which seeks for human beings to use their own reason to free themselves from external attributes and impositions, whether they are emanated by subjects who blindly obey the State, Church or the same school (Kant, 2015). In his characteristic call to contradiction, Nietzsche

learns from Kant that faculties such as imagination, understanding and reason are related to each other from an active and non-passive possibility, although he later distinguishes them as art and knowledge (Nietzsche, 2009).

In this sense, a liberation of the self is sought in relation to the realization of the Other, a radical selfhood to reach the inconceivable otherness. Thus, for Kant the realization of being is achieved in criticism and it must manifest a high degree of concordance between the faculties (imagination, understanding and reason) as well as the justification of the genesis of common sense (Deleuze, 2008, p.46).

Blunt but not detached from the Kantian *sapere aude*: “we are men of conscience : we do not want to return to what seems to us as outdated and stabbed, to something 'unlikely', whether it is called God, Virtue, Truth, Justice, Love to others; that we don't allow bridges of lies to old ideals ”(Nietzsche, 2009, p.16). Nietzsche has to stay in the plane of the unintelligible because that is the great certainty taught by Kant's philosophy (Nietzsche, 2009, pp. 143-144). But Nietzsche differs from Kant in that the latter, like idealist philosophers, invokes a theological principle to try to respond to any experience that exceeds the limits of rationality (Deleuze, 2008), a situation that Nietzsche indicates through distance as essential, neither good nor bad, neither love nor hate: that is the old fortress.

At this point, it is necessary to know that if there is room for a transit, for a “bridge”, according to Nietzsche, this cannot be any other than the advent of the metaphorized human as *Übermensch* which is the metaphor that achieves the dissolution of “the majestic moral buildings” that are representative of the Kantian doctrine (Nietzsche, 2009, p.14). For this reason, Nietzschean philosophy emphasizes romantically that one learns to read and write with life; philosophy and demolition of dogmas, to be liberated by the unforgiving moment of thinking. Is there another way to metamorphose the relationships of active, creative forces, and be different from attentive reading and writing from the difference as intermittence of a possible event?

Nietzsche also attacks the idea of a human freedom based on the logic of the market or its supposed ethical-ontological primacy; He is a critic of the commodification of human relations and of the new and apparent freedom conditioned by the price or debt dimension that the individuals of a society can generate. It is a mistake that human relations are determined by the laws of the market (Nietzsche, 2009, pp.165-167).

Likewise, theoretically, he faces the ways of being that operate under the terms of security (feeling of security, collective security) or under supreme moral laws that are imposed by the "tyrannies of fear" (Nietzsche, 2009, p.166). In *Aurora* the aphorisms 174 and 175 are directed exclusively to analyze the social

decay and the bad conscience that the “sympathetic affections” of the commodification of the human produce (to provide excess comfort and continuous well-being to the other as the perfect disguise of the social impulse of fear).

He states (Nietzsche, 2009) that “We see arising the culture of a society for which commerce is the soul” (p.167). That is, Nietzsche distrusts the mercantilist logic that seems to appropriate all aspects of human knowledge: “who and how many consume this?” (Colli and Montinari, 2004, p. 167), whether arts, sciences, religions, human education, politics, peoples, political parties. A culture that bases its destiny on the commodification of reality and on the exploitation of nature, which despises the difficulties and complexity of the human, implies, according to Nietzsche, that everything that is produced is elucidated and interconnected through the discourse of supply and demand.

Although any emancipatory political project or movement seemed to Nietzsche to be dominated by “slave morals,” it must be mentioned that his idea of “liberation” is affirmed from an individualistic aesthetic experience. That is why for Nietzsche the work of thought is what allows human beings to move in the pluralistic terrain of being and knowing, through the possibility of transvaluation and creation as indispensable elements for the affirmation of life.

Nietzsche calls the *will to dominate* a unifying force, perfectly impersonal, which confers a new order and a new interpretation on elements that were hitherto determined by another domination. This notion is therefore, not only alien to the significance assigned by the dominant ideology, but directly opposite, since in this last *will to dominate* it is understood as the desire to dominate, overcome, oppress others, subject them to values and existing hierarchies (Zuleta, 2018, p.146).

The condition of multiplicity manages to imprint several senses in the reality of things: there is not a single language, there is no straight and unequivocal path in knowledge, nor the design or objective of an aspiration to the absolute, since it is through the condition of multiplicity that the senses as well as the conceptualizations of knowledge can be besieged. In this way, the individual is released under the tutelage of the transvaluation that implies the creative will and living in the most human way possible.

Therefore, the inquiries about the human do not conclude in Nietzschean philosophy and are proposed as imminent in terms of the sense of freedom, the cultivation of taste and a way of thinking that manifests the difference against the utilitarianism and egalitarianism of the preponderant compensations of scientific rationality or of a religion that is hardly assumed as unequivocal (Deleuze, 2013, p.67). In this regard, Nietzsche points out that science “is the at-

tempt to create for all phenomena an agreed and common language in order to make nature more easily calculable, and therefore, controllable" (Colli and Montinari, 2004, p.113).

For this reason, Nietzschean philosophy assumes liberation from undervaluation as a possibility of contradiction towards elements of "bad conscience" such as solidified identity, equality and balance in a rigid-mathematical plans and theological-utilitarian way of thinking that does not allow affirm the difference or multiplicity of senses and that rather present human reality as something uniform and undifferentiated (Deleuze, 2013). For Nietzsche if the rational stage operates in indifference, its project also ends abruptly in a disposition without place to differences, operating under the ascetic and religious dimension of the dominant morality that in a possible Nietzschean synthesis is understood as a prejudiced and insufficient description of all that happens.

Freire and the Reality of the Oppressed: Coloniality and Racism in Latin America

If Nietzsche warns of the possible danger of the commodification of the human, almost a century later, in Latin America, Paulo Freire confronts, from the pedagogy and philosophy of education, a segment of the problem that the German philosopher had already described in large part of his work. Nietzsche criticizes the way in which the human educational project proposed by the Enlightenment was undertaken, and in this regard, Freire claims that this rationalist model was adapted in Latin America by many governments and by political and academic elites. This prototype of education arrived in the South American context, while establishing a kind of molecular entrenchment of the problems of colonialism, commodification and the preoccupation with development from the monetary point of view gave way to the strengthening of racism in bodies as well as in subjectivities.

The problem of colonialism, according to Dussel (2016), begins with the conquest of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans by the Europeans. The Spanish, Portuguese and English, mainly, organized a colonial world from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth century in the American territories. This world order, at the same time, proposes philosophical, political, religious and linguistic elements drawn from the "Latin-medieval" culture that are undoubtedly put under the pretense of universality of a "modern European philosophy" establishing the same time an instance of domination and hegemony about the ways of thinking of communities-others (Dussel, 2016).

However, the downside of a philosophy with universal aspirations is that it results in an adherence to applying hegemonic relationships to other forms of philosophical thinking or not. Therefore, the problem tends to be called colonialism and coloniality, because it was not only the establishment of European colonies through direct violence and war; it is also the inheritance that still permeates within subjectivities, the ways of thinking and of relating to the other and with Nature.

Colonialism based on a "philosophical Eurocentrism" is called into question by Dussel (2016), Santos (2014), Castro-Gómez (2016), Mignolo (2017) and Freire (2002, 2015), among other thinkers, who agree that this process of dominance was based on a philosophy with pretensions to establish universals, which ended up destroying and invisibilizing the theoretical resources of other cultures (Dussel, 2016, p. 22).

For the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez, the colonialism that has taken place in the Americas since the 16th century "was the basis on which the rational and international division of labor was established that would boost the expansion of capitalism throughout the entire planet (Castro-Gómez, 2016, p. 53). It should be noted that colonialism "refers to the military subjugation, territorial occupation, and legal administration of a people by a foreign imperial power" (Castro-Gómez, 2016, p. 260); In addition, colonialism carries with it another unfortunate episode called coloniality, which "alludes to the inheritances that colonialism leaves in the symbolic, affective and cognitive order" (Castro-Gómez, 2016, p. 260).

In coloniality, according to Mignolo (2017), lies the darker side of modernity: racism, exploitation, dispossession, language reduction, depreciation of 'other' knowledge. According to Mignolo (2017) the permanence in a "hegemonic epistemic viewpoint" (p. 406) is the frame of reference of coloniality. Faced with this problem, the pedagogue Paulo Freire values educational activity as the pressing fact in order to reconstitute the inquiry into the human and the social that seems to be forgotten or confused with contents and purposes delocalized or decontextualized colonialism.

For this pedagogue, then, education is what makes the human being able to ascend from naivety to criticism, that is, allowing him to trace the quest for his freedom (Freire, 2002). For Freire, colonization "was first and foremost a commercial enterprise" (Freire, 2002, p. 61), an economic exploitation of natural resources and a violent confrontation with native cultures under the interest of extending the commercial exploitation of the land.

In Freirean pedagogy education is proposed as a human process in close connection with the Other, that is carried out to exercise social change and to strengthen individual freedom. The choice of every age is between participating

in an education for alienated domestication or an education for freedom (Freire, 2002, pp. 25-26). At this point education for Freire will be the commitment to the liberation of the subjects from the precepts of coloniality.

Throughout his work Freire supports the possibility of exerting total radicality in the transformation of affective, cognitive and symbolic orders. It states that oppression also occurs because of the commodification of human relations, by the submission of thinking to the field of violence and fear. In this sense, if education is the transmission of knowledge, transformation of knowledge and the construction of human values and mutation of culture, it must also be the substrate where the eventuality of criticism and the re-creation of other relationships are affirmed.

The commodification of the human being can be understood as the criterion of exploitation which operates around the attainment of lucrative purposes for human relations. Not only is the subject exploited in their work realities, the subject is also exploited in his vital conditions: his freedom, his dreams, his conscience, his psyche is exploited (Han, 2015). The commodification of the human can be treated as a problem that touches the educational, because in this contradiction the advent of society lies not in its humanization but in its reification.

And with Freire, education has no other possible purpose but the humanization of the human being, overcoming naivety and achieving a critical attitude towards: 1) the aim of extending the ideal of maintaining commercial exploitation of the land for the benefit of minority oligarchs (being an active part of coloniality), and 2) pedagogical projects that are a reference in the formation of docile subjects and, above all, that are useful to the previous point. In this type of "banking education," as Freire called it, human beings cannot understand their historical, social or political situation and in the face of the technologization of human relations and tend not to be interested in human problems or the current state of affairs in the world outside of pleasure and "need to know" (Freire, 2015, p. 95).

Freire's critique of the capitalist system lies in the political and economic operability of this type of banking education, forming consensus and also subjects to supposedly correspond to the technological and globalization project of the 21st century, but it does not supply knowledge or values for human beings to face the myriad social problems that can also be inferred in this project.

For example, the problem of racism, which according to Wallerstein (2005) is a functional part of the capitalist economy-world and has therefore spread considerably. However, its debate and criticism has become less visible in the public (Wallerstein, 2005). This problem is political and economic because purposes such as: (i) keeping people within the system as inferior beings can be "economically exploited and used as scapegoats" (Wallerstein, 2005, p. 66). (ii)

participate in the uncritical attitude that allows the growth of individualism and the extension of historical social inequalities; (iii) increase the basis on which supposed cultural superiority and inferiority revolves and hence the justification for political and/or military interventions.

Both Freire (2015) and Wallerstein (2005) understand that this capitalist economy, with the validity of neoliberalism, justifies its hierarchies on the basis of economic and political problems such as racism (Wallerstein, 2005) and from other forms of expression such as sexism, machismo, classism and "verbal violence" (Freire, 2015, p. 141), which are also part of colonialist-capitalist logic. Hence Freirean pedagogy seeks the liberation of the human being through the fight against any form of economic and political oppression; therefore, in Freire, human education results in an eminently political act.

According to Freire, a clear relationship is expressed between education and political culture: a political-pedagogical practice (Freire, 1980, 2002, 2015); and the thesis that education cannot be apolitical is made public, since it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that in human education commitment, intermittency or the duration of the political is not deployed; to support this view results for Freire in a fallacy that suits the capitalist scheme. In Freirean pedagogy the educational practice does not have to be based on the standardization or routine of the pre-established, since that would mean assimilating the project of adaptation of neoliberalism that revolves in the bureaucracy and the ghost of a democracy which rather results in an anti-democracy (Freire and Faundez, 2018).

Then, for Freire, educational practice and pedagogical discourse on human education are still unfolding in the possibility of creativity. A liberation that begins in the fight against the oppression of subjectivities; to realize that forms of oppression are also given in today's education and these are not done directly or physically, but are established on a principle of positivity that is maximized in the human psyche through disorientation in the world of hyperconsumption and the reductionism of the discourse of supply and demand.

Perhaps Freire also makes it possible to see that, within an extremely capitalist society, oppression is assimilated and executed in different ways. The increasing "introduction of domination" (Freire, 2015, p. 56), which is contrary to the problematization of the culture of domination, seeks to imprison the subjects in a certain time when no form of struggle is sought. For example, following the philosopher Byung Chul Han, this can now be evident in the crushing technologization of bodies that is done within the "voluntary nudity" through the uncritical use of the *smartphone* or other "smart" devices (as a representation of consumerism of the technological); in addition, through over-exposure in virtual spaces where perpetual exchange and excess information prevail, which

come to be presented as the most efficient form of oppression, torture and surveillance (Han, 2015).

Freire understands that in the educational process every banking conception of education must be overcome, in which vertical relationships prevail: a master, a receptacle and a series of knowledge for the master to dose according to his will. For Freire, pedagogy is also a struggle against the mechanical way of submitting to inherited knowledge that tries to reproduce socially dominant values. In the face of this, with Freirean pedagogy it can be understood that the idea of freedom in the human being does not abandon its character of struggle, of risk, brightness of curiosity, openness to the question and recognition of criticism, a political direction towards alternativity, a risk for the transformation of culture, starting from the construction of subjects with free, critical and autonomous personalities.

Stanislaus Zuleta: Philosophical Education in the Face of the Heyday of Exploitation and War

For Estanislao Zuleta education is a struggle, a "battlefield" (Zuleta, 2016), which is accentuated in the production and transformation of knowledge that seeks to expand critical activity and responsibility with living and thinking. Zuleta lived in the violent Colombian 20th century, while intellectually feeding on Kantian, Nietzschean and Heideggerian philosophy; it apprehends vital elements and teaches them so that subjects can confront the social and human phenomena of the present. For this reason, for Zuleta education is understood as liberation from domestication. And in the face of this, Zuleta's philosophical language is frank: part of the Colombian tragedy is education for the uniformity of the subject, "the inhibitory education of thought, desire and knowledge. An education made so that individuals do not act, so that they are not subjects of their history, which is a way of preventing, controlling thinking and acting" (Zuleta, 2016, p. 83).

The possibility offered by the cultural critique of Estanislao Zuleta is that human thought has all the capabilities to separate itself to a large degree from the memorization of information, repetition of knowledge and distancing of criticism, those of which are closely linked to school formation and the capitalist consciousness of the present (Zuleta, 2016). Domestication in education begins by believing that it is only a matter of memorizing and repeating what the teacher-domesticated and the domesticated educational apparatus suits you: to fit and correspond to the purposes of the market and the technological industry without evoking any questions about being or nothingness or about good and

evil or about transcendence and imminence and, perhaps, even less about the present or the future.

Is there an occurrence or an extension of the human being's distance from his critical capacity? Zuleta analyses the Colombian education system of the late twentieth century and warns that the comfort and ease of assuming a Eurocentric knowledge is increasing, since it is based on apparent incontrovertible truths and related to an often uncritical aside for the necessary "anguish of thinking" (Zuleta, 2016, p. 21). Education is being configured all the time and alarmingly with the methods, models and discourses of industry and the market (Zuleta, 2016).

This leads Zuleta to establish a critique of teachers' thinking and its transmission to students; points out, from their socio-cultural context, that teachers have the possibility of deploying the activity of thinking through an intellectual struggle against the system that admits domestication, promoting in people not adaptation to the forms of life of the market or of financial neoliberalism (buying, selling, owing), but the conception of a better society that manages to defend the world of life, without falling into the despotism of inhibiting the voice or repression of thought. In the Colombian school context, Zuleta's analysis indicates (2016), that it is the student who seems to have no right to think, that is, to criticize, to counterargue, to controvert, to propose, to create, to transform and to live knowledge.

Criticism of education by Zuletrian philosophy implies a resumption of a critical attitude, not only in remembering or repeating what can be drawn from a model of education pre-established by the monopoly of a neoliberal monoculture, but also in understanding critically the processes of knowledge acquisition, symbolic exchange and interconnection with the Other, without falling into the passivity of a dogmatic truth devoid of life and research interest.

To develop critical thinking or inhibit critical thinking? Faced with this possible intentionality, Zuleta casts a philosophical critique of the role of the teacher, the Eurocentric educational model, the criteria of regulation of the thinking and repression of the body that occur in schools precisely because of the absence of philosophy in school education. For Zuleta (2016) the great mistake of the school is to educate without philosophy and under that weakness, the uninterrupted formation of a path or passage that seeks the adaptation and domestication of existence and with this the perfect development of the financial model.

But what is philosophy and how important is it to human education? For Zuleta, philosophy "is the ability to think things through things, to ask questions, to see contradictions" (Zuleta, 2016, p. 23), which allows the human being to realize his being through knowledge, "to know why he does something, to

know why he does it , for whom he does it" (Zuleta, 2016, p. 23). "Philosophy is not a body of knowing that can be transmitted. It's a critical practice. It is an organized, demanding and rigorous suspicion. This kind of attitude is what we would have to try to teach" (Zuleta, 2016, p. 118).

Zuleta proposes a perspective on human education whose basis is not regulated by the intentions of either the financial sector or the technology and audiovisual industry, since in this monetary and then cyber-net regulation, which is part of the process of domestication, subjects tend to worry about the consecutive acquisition of currency, to acquire more information with a minimum of effort, that is, that reproduces more, is not thought (Zuleta, 2016, pp. 19-25). Human education begins to move in the world of super-production without any hassle to the logic of the market (buy-sale, offer-demand, debt-credit), where the educating human beings is confused with immediate access to information clusters while creating an illusion of learning that unfolds in an ideology of consumption.

This situation can undoubtedly be seen as a problem that can now be referred to as "cognitive capitalism" which, according to Galcerán (2007), delimits the centrality of the mode of production of the capitalist situation in the production of the knowledge of the subjects. And it is that in relationships in which the capitalist character is assumed without exercising domination and / or direct exploitation, the subjects are engaged in the illusion of seemingly free societies, established in the "free" movement of information and in the "free" flow but also tends to reconfigure the educational apparatus according to the quantifications of the global market (Galcerán, 2007).

Paradoxically, it is the advancement of human knowledge within a context where coloniality, dogmatism or the hegemony of an ideology of consumption generally prevail, which promotes or generates a new form of energy that manages to invisibilise the crisis of the Capitalism.

According to Zuleta, the absence of philosophy in schools (and in the life of the human being in general) leads to the subject adopting an "illusion of learning" (Zuleta, 2016, p. 22) that limits seeing, hearing, repeating and reproducing rather than provoking or inciting activity-thinking. The philosophy of Stanislaus Zuleta points out that this is perhaps the most harmful aspect of an "educational technology" without a critical attitude, the repression of thought, a departure from the concept in the assimilation of knowledge and the imposition of an "illusion which solidifies with school training incommunicado with philosophy, understood as a tool for the vital appropriation of concepts and indispensable for autonomy and, at the same time, for the struggle for a society made up of people aspire to emancipation, rationality and to be subjects of their history (Zuleta, 2016).

Zuleta assumes the notion of philosophical education from a rationalist level. The cultivation of reason in conjunction with the development of critical thinking is a fundamental part of that liberation. Zuleta learns from Kantian philosophy that the rationalism of philosophy can be the framework that sustains a possible rationalist pedagogical project (in a not too Eurocentric perspective) that it can provide to the education and school training of the subject to the ability to renounce a passive mindset that no longer accepts authority, tradition, supposed truths or prejudices without first subjecting them to criticism; that will provide them with knowledge and values to understand the reality of the Other and thus enter into dialogue with other knowledge. Free yourself from domestication to be aware of the necessary risk of thinking that it involves accepting error, incompleteness and mistakes as attributes of the human.

Meeting Points: Education, Liberation, Critical Thinking and Alterity

In the Nietzscheana philosophy *sapere aude* is promoted but radically, that is, on a plane of immanence and not of transcendence. It is not a liberation from nature but a liberation from the cultural condition of what is necessary. For Nietzsche, a nihilistic and decadent cultural condition is formed as long as the very quest for freedom is suppressed without understanding liberation as an unintelligible spill that involves the development of active forces in human relations. The imitation and veneration of nature are elementary to the perspectivism of the Nietzscheana philosophy. His instinctive understanding lies in being able to grow with nature intimately and without submitting to it (Nietzsche, 2000).

Human beings are educated to recognize themselves in nature. According to Nietzsche, in the enduring struggle for life, education makes and transcends culture (Nietzsche, 2000). With this in mind, Freire speaks in this sense of "cultural mutation" (Freire, 2015), that the cultural struggle is also a struggle against political and economic oppression (Freire and Faundez, 2018). Both Nietzsche and Freire oppose education guided by the determinism of the logic of the market and the criterion of the usefulness that aspires to reproduce life forms that are simply combustible for the domestication project coined by both Nihilism and by Capitalism.

Hence in Zuleta there is a relationship between critical thinking and philosophy as an expression-motor that can transform the reality of schools within their work in the formation of subjects who aspire to know: an open battleground for writing and (Zuleta, 2018). "The work of suspicion consists in subjecting all elements to elaboration and criticism, which allows to overcome

the power of force – repression, dominant ideology, rationalization, etc. – that keeps them scattered, juxtaposed or falsely connected" (Zuleta, 2018, p. 150). A philosophical education as an alternative to the domestication of banking and uncritical education that removes people from their role within history as transformers of it.

At this point it can be noted that for Nietzsche, as well as for Freire and Zuleta, education is liberation: *Befreiung*, *libertao*, an aspiration to the freedom of thinking. First, liberation against oppression or discipline in training through control, classification or punishment, a subject against which authors are consistent and build pedagogical-philosophical forks that contradict the forms of punishment in school education (Nietzsche, 2009; Freire 1980, 2015); then, liberation from theories and practices linked to domestication, especially in school training (which ends up being a functional part of a political, moral and religious education of subjects, but which revolves around acritical elements). If there was no improvement through the discipline of the bodies, there could not be improvement through the subjugation of the minds.

Education cannot, then, be delineated from the finitude of the philosophical substrate, that is, from the love of thinking, from the love to teach (Freire, 2015, p. 132; Zuleta, 2016, p. 45) or in other words, human freedom¹ as the possible power of rebellion. The possible impulse of education is sustained in the transmission of feelings and knowledge and in the flow of mysterious rebellion involving the possibility of the unintelligible that characterizes human freedom (Nietzsche, 2009, pp. 142-149; Freire, 2015, pp. 129-138).

The ways of knowing that designate human beings, nature, society, the Other, do not have to be composed of dogmatisms. In this sense, in the conception of education it must be understood that "there is no universal concept of knowledge, nor is there a universal essence of things", there are different ways of knowing and different ways of acquiring knowledge (Feyerabend, 2015), as well as the concept of reality influences the way of thinking, acting and feeling of human beings, and that this concept is built on different psychological, social and cultural factors (Feyerabend, 2015, p. 128); therefore, it may be inadmissible for education to see its absolute reality on the market stage or in technology.

1. It may not be entirely concrete to indicate that this suggestion to rebelliousness came from a possible Marxist root within the thought freireano. It is clear that Freire does not understand the idea of freedom in the same sense as Marxism presupposes it, but rather in relation to a religious ecumenism that Freire alludes to in several texts and interviews (Freire, 2015; Freire and Faundez, 2018). We should mention that although Freire himself admits to having written his famous *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* under Marx's method of class analysis, this was a situation that the same Marxist community of his time reproved. Freire himself said: "It is ironic that some Marxists have criticized me for not paying enough attention to the analysis of social class" (Freire, 2015, p. 143).

Human life is characterized by its different forms of reality, that is, by its stage until the indefinable stage of alterity.

On the other hand, the freedom indicated by today's neoliberalism that part of cognitive and financial capitalism does not have to be confused with an untimely liberalism of Dewey, Tocqueville or Arendt, for example. What is defined in the middle of the 21st century as "freedom" for neoliberalism is understood as the assimilation of the doctrines of the free market where the public implies a direct subsidy to the financial and business sector (Chomsky, 2016).

At this point, it must be understood that the traditional ideas that embody the political, the economic, the cultural, only acquire their movement if there is an operability maintained in the logic of the purchase and sale of the Other and of the World (Chomsky, 2001). And this situation also seems to make a pronounced mistake of increasing militarization, the false democratization, and the ridiculous redistribution of wealth by most current governments, especially in Latin America. In education, to enlarge the charms of the market, rather than to undertake a philosophical and cultural critique of this situation, is also part of the error.

In short, for these three authors education and its relationship with human freedom implies the permanent openness towards the critical attitude, the construction-transformation and the ethical-political start towards other human relationships with knowledge and values (Nietzsche); persist in the fight against all kinds of oppression and against the invisibilization of alterity (Freire); find in philosophical education, from the recognition of the Other and the development of critical thinking, a possible source for achieving the affirmation of life (Zuleta).

Conclusions

While Nietzschean philosophy also deals with the education of the human being; it does not aspire to be a universal philosophy; therefore, if there are results of its interpretation, they have to be viewed outside of domination and hegemony.

Freirean pedagogy establishes relationships between education and social needs, but from a perspective that finds the immersion of education in the field of neoliberalism to be an unfortunate mistake (market logic, Eurocentric theories, models default domestication project).

Philosophical education is for Zuleta a possible response to the problem of uncritical schooling that inhibits thought or prepares subjects for domestication and indoctrination.

Freedom in education, then, is to know in order to dissent, choose, co-create together with the Other so that a way of being and being more critical is achieved that allows to feel or voice our thoughts about society, to understand those among whom one lives, to understand what information, methods, stories are consumed, accepted and transgressed, in order to learn to criticize and criticize them, perhaps pointing to another ethic and other ways of thinking.

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